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

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



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T. H. GREEN: CRITIC OF EMPIRICISM

By

HOWARD SELSAM

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
in the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University

New York
1930

Columbia University
in the City of New York

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PREFACE

This essay may be looked upon either as a study in the history of modern philosophy or as a study in certain problems of metaphysics and logic. To those who view as antiquated the questions with which Green was concerned in his criticism of the empiricists, this essay may be justified by its historical interest. But since it is not primarily an historical study, no attempt has been made to go behind Green's treatment of empiricism into the possible religious, economical, or sociological factors underlying both empiricism and the idealistic opposition. One modern school would ask if Green did not neglect to consider what Locke was really concerned about, *why* he developed the particular philosophy he did. Unfortunately, perhaps, Green lived before the advent of these modern methods, and taking a thinker at his own appraisal he attempted a logical and not a sociological examination of his thought. While such a sociological examination might be useful in providing a broader setting for his criticism, it is believed that concentration on Green's logical analysis is equally valid and of greater philosophical significance.

Overlooking the matter of philosophical history it may be urged that there is much in Green still living in the philosophies of America, England, and the Continent, and that, further, there are elements in his criticism which might be of value in clearing up some of the obfuscations in contemporary controversy. It would be interesting to employ some of Green's principles in the examination of current philosophic doctrines, especially those which are seeking an intelligible bond between philosophy and modern physics, but that is beyond the nature and scope of the present work.

No particular difficulty should arise through the two very different uses of the term " experience " on the part of Green and the philosophers he is criticising. Quite obviously the term represents two distinct concepts. Distinct, however, as they may be, they are not contradictories, for in so far as Locke's concept is in-

telligible, it is taken up as a part or function in the organic whole Green designates " experience."

In conclusion I wish to express my indebtedness to Professor Richard McKeon for his valuable suggestions and criticism in the preparation of this essay.

HOWARD SELSAM

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NEW YORK CITY,
August, 1930

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INTRODUCTION

Almost half a century has elapsed since the death of Thomas Hill Green and the posthumous publication of his collected works. His influence has been widely attested to, most notably, perhaps, by Bradley and Bosanquet in England and Professor Dewey in America. But there have been significant developments in philosophy since Green's career came to its untimely end, and his form of neo-kantianism appears to us as outmoded. Although many of his particular doctrines have become commonplaces, his metaphysical system can scarcely find contemporary favor. Yet it would generally be admitted that his philosophical failure was not an anachronism, to employ his own distinction, but was one which in its failure "brought out a new truth and compelled a step forward in the progress of thought." No serious philosopher, in the english-speaking world, can stand quite on the ground philosophy occupied before the advent of Green's criticism and his introduction of kantian principles into England.

One of the things which makes his philosophy of especial interest both to the historian and metaphysician is that in him we have a very particular stage of the "critical" philosophy; one that avoided the "imaginary flights of Hegel" on the one hand, and many of the encumbrances that remained in the kantian philosophy on the other. He was able to elaborate a world view impossible to later members of the school, for whom either the critical philosophy had turned upon itself, or who simply "got over" the insoluble problems of philosophy. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of Green's thought was due to the fact that, unlike Bradley, but akin to the spirit of Leibniz and Kant, he required a system of metaphysics which would justify both the procedure of the sciences, and the political and social organisation of man. His interests were those of his time, and although he fought wholeheartedly the empiricism and utilitarianism then current in England, its problems were his, and he thought himself called upon to build his answers on a firmer foundation than he found his contemporaries able to provide.

It has long been recognised that the essence of Green's philosophy is to be found in his critical writings, and that these are

astute and penetrating. Few have dared to attack his criticism; indeed, it has often been accepted where his own constructive system has been rejected or ignored. But are not the same principles involved in both? Unquestionably they are, but that they seriously invalidate his criticism would be difficult to maintain consistently, for whereas the doctrines taken exception to are the beginning of his constructive philosophy, they are offered in his criticism, with certain few exceptions, as suggested solutions to the *culs-de-sac* and embarrassments of the philosophy under examination. His criticism proceeds on the basis of a very limited number of logical principles and metaphysical beliefs. It will not be difficult to determine the number and nature of these. Like the Socrates of the platonic dialogues, his method consists largely in forcing his opponent, on the ground of his own terms, into contradictions and inconsistencies.

Green's formal indictment of empiricism (the technical meaning of which will appear in the course of the study) was so complete, so thorough and so devastating, that one would wonder how empiricism could still flourish, or even survive, were it not for the recognition that philosophies founded on a popular mode of thought are little affected by refutation. It cannot but make, however, current versions of the lockeian philosophy appear even more anachronistic than they did to the kantians of the last century. The only explanation is that such systems of thought are deeply rooted in the commonsense of man, and that the need for logical consistency and intelligible first principles is not always present even among philosophers and scientists, but occurs only sporadically, producing when it does occur, men who, like Hume, are "willing to follow the lead of ideas." As Bradley has suggested, there are no objections to having thoughts about the world as a whole, the totality of experience; but to do it systematically and consistently—that is not approved of.

Green's primary concern was to think about the whole of experience and to think about it consistently. A philosophy which did not account for the knowledge we feel ourselves to have, and a theory of morals which could not explain our actual moral ideas and conduct, must stand condemned. Neither, unlike most of his contemporaries, could he accept any explanation of our knowledge and moral life which seeks to derive them from something other than themselves. In short, there can be no "natural history" of knowledge or morals. Such an interpretation cannot escape the

fallacies which, he insisted, the genetic method always involves. If, for example, any one idea was fundamental in his criticism it was that the origin of experience could not be explained in terms derived from experience, and which thus presuppose it. Locke's attempt failed because he tried the impossible. Thus must all attempts fail that seek to explain mind and knowledge in terms that ignore their own explanations.[1]

Like the empiricists whom he attacked, Green insisted that there was no knowledge without experience and that the business of all philosophy was the analysis of experience. Unlike them, however, he refused any attempt to go outside of experience for terms in which to explain it, since the fundamental postulate of his "idealism" was that there is nothing outside of experience; and even if there were, nothing could be known by reference to it.[2] And if it be asked how the origin of experience is to be explained, if both outer reference is impossible and explanation in terms within it illusory, the answer is simply that by the very nature of experience, its origin admits not of explanation. From this standpoint he was an empiricist—if not a more consistent one than any of the classic english thinkers. His whole metaphysic is an attempt to analyse experience and to understand the mutual implications of its elements. The idealism, then, which he offered in place of the empiricism of Locke and Mill and Spencer was not what these men would have understood by idealism. He claims to oppose to the empiricism of Locke and the "false" idealism of Berkeley and Hume the only valid idealism: "that idealism which trusts, not to a guess about what is beyond experience, but to analysis of what is within it."[3] True idealism, it is clear, does not admit an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but is "the recognition of the empirical as itself ideal."[4] Green's unceasing effort is to make more of experience, not less, and he cannot rest satisfied in a philosophy that volatises or truncates our world of fact and externality.[5] Once his conception of idealism is understood, the opposition of his empirical contemporaries, where it does not rest on misinterpretations, seems wholly superficial.

It has been said, in tribute to Green, that he was a practical

[1] *Prolegomena to Ethics,* sect. 9.
[2] *ibid.,* sect. 7.
[3] *Works,* I, 449.
[4] *ibid.,* I, 188.
[5] Bosanquet, *Meeting of Extremes,* p. 2.

philosopher, and not a mere theorist; that he was not one who speculated for the sheer pleasure of the dialectic involved. It was his profound belief "that all action should spring from conviction . . . that made him a philosopher."[6] This is certainly true, and indicates wherein he would be in sympathy with present-day instrumentalism. Logical dictates, however, would have prevented him from building a metaphysic on the conception of thought as instrumental to action. That thought is an instrument of the organism, and takes its rise in the problematic situation, he might well have admitted for practical purposes. But, and this is important, he would have had to qualify each doctrine by its converse, for there is a sense in which it can be said that the organism exists only for or in thought, and that thought itself alone constitutes the problem. The logical primacy or priority of thought cannot be cast aside, and a philosophy founded on instrumentalism would have been as repugnant to him as was the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer.

The extreme precision of Green's philosophical writing has frequently been the object of both admiration and apology. Like his thought, his writing was exact and painstaking. But this, together with the awkward organisation of his critical works—and the fact that several of them were lectures which were never revised for publication—makes them unusually difficult and tedious. One can read Hume over and over again in the time required to read Green's lengthy and laborious introductions. For this reason, among others, an analysis of his criticism, with an attempt both to uncover the essential errors he finds in the empiricists and to determine the principles which he himself employs, may be of use in throwing light on the empirical tradition, on the necessity of the critical reconstruction, and on Green's own philosophic thought. Green liked to compare the opposition of the critical philosophy to empiricism, or the philosophy of feeling, with the reaction of Plato against the Sophists. And like the criticism of Plato, Green's work in a more modern and humble way represents a significant event in the history of philosophy.

[6] Dewey, "Phil. of Green," *Andover Rev.*, II, 338.

I

THE CLASSIC TRADITION OF EMPIRICISM: LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME

i

Green's criticism of the english empirical tradition, as represented in its origins by Locke and Hume, and as found in the naturalism and positivism of his contemporaries, is not to be accounted for simply by reference to his moral and religious interests. That these played a prominent part in his thought no one can doubt, but he was, and professed himself to be, preëminently a metaphysician. For him science, art, morality, and religion formed one indivisible whole, the synthesis and explanation of which, metaphysic alone could provide. His whole interest was thus involved in his criticism of empiricism, which he found as impossible theoretically as he thought it to be pernicious practically. It could explain no one of man's activities, and if it could appear to uphold one against the other, it was only at the expense of inconsistency. One must bear in mind that he has no animadversions against Locke and Hume themselves. With the exception of the "later" Hume they have his unstinted admiration as men whose great merit lay in their willingness to "follow the lead of ideas," and he would say of Locke as he did of Hume, that he "was a philosopher because he could not help it." It is clear throughout his essays that it was the supposed successors of Hume who aroused his ire and were objects of his censure.

1. Of the many inadequacies and shortcomings of english speculation of his time that Green charged against Locke and Hume, certain essential features may be distinguished. Fundamental, perhaps, is the false view of the relation of man and nature. In the empirical tradition they had been separated irrationally, and can thus be made to appear as antithetical. The naturalist tries to avoid infecting nature with his theology or metaphysic. He even prides himself on his escape from anthropomorphism without realising that all science is anthropomorphic. In seeking to place himself in a position of pure receptivity, he attempts the impossible. For "that which he calls nature . . . is

traversed by the currents of his intellect. . . ." [1] "By names and theory, by distinction and comparison, by substantiating relations and bringing substances into relation, he has penetrated nature, and in penetrating it has sown himself broadcast over it." [2] These views, representing the contrast between empiricism and the critical philosophy, have the most far-reaching practical consequences. Not only does the false antithesis between man and nature have disastrous results for science, philosophy, and the moral life, the misunderstood oppositions between inner and outer, subjective and objective, fantastic and real, are a heavy burden on the human spirit.[3] Such dualisms weigh humanity down.

2. Due to this inadequate analysis of the world as known, and of the process of knowledge, empiricism has been unable to answer the second great question of philosophy, "What is the world that he (man) has made for himself, and how has he been able to make it?" [4] There can be no genuine theory of morals for the popular (empirical) philosophy. It cannot afford a foundation for ethics, which, for it, rests wholly on feeling, of which no account is given.[5] Man can never know the moral world by an imaginary analysis of "natural" feelings and faculties.[6] And unless we have arrived at some conclusion as to the relation of man and nature we can have no assurance that our theory of ethics is other than wasted labor.[7] Unless there is something in man independent of the forces of nature, what meaning is there in enjoining him to conform to natural laws? How can the natural science of man be the basis of a practical art? [8] Like many other moralists, the modern english utilitarian is generally better than his logic. But man must theorise his practice, and the failure to do so adequately must cripple the practice itself.[9] The hopelessness of the situation lies in the fact that, although art, religion, and political life have outgrown the nominalistic logic and the empirical psychology, the speculative man has no other means of accounting for them to

[1] *Works,* III, 95.
[2] *loc. cit.*
[3] *ibid.,* I, 142.
[4] *ibid.,* III, 96.
[5] *ibid.,* III, 97.
[6] *ibid.,* III, 113.
[7] *Proleg.,* sect. 52.
[8] *ibid.,* sect. 7.
[9] *Works,* III, 124.

himself than by the formulae derived from that logic and psychology.[10]

3. Empiricism, further, has not been able to provide an adequate philosophy of science. True, it has earnestly striven to do so, but it has accomplished only the appearance of having attained its end, for the destruction of science is involved in that of religion and metaphysics. Science and religion are equally incompatible with empiricism, and it vainly pretends to uphold one and deny the other. "Empiricism cannot be worked in two directions at once. . . ." [11] Hume, to his great credit, is the living example of this. His scepticism is the legitimate outcome of Locke's empiricism. Once and for all, he made popular philosophy consistent with itself, but his so-called followers have failed to understand his teaching. If later humeians have seemed to make knowledge and virtue possible, they have done so only at the cost of inconsistency.[12] One of the most notable results of this failure to understand Hume aright is the complete separation of metaphysics and science that the Positive Philosophy attempts. Having learned that Hume's system makes metaphysics impossible, they have discarded it, only to have it creep into their sciences in the garb of misunderstood distinctions and in a new set of mechanical or physiological metaphors.[13] Science, in short, trying to found itself securely on false epistemological distinctions, is as philosophical as anything could be, and has no philosophy that can justify its practice.

4. Finally, Green lays on empiricism the blame for the barrenness of english philosophical thought since Hume. He insists that there has been no real speculation in England for a century. English philosophy is at a standstill because it has persisted in philosophising upon principles which Hume, their advocate, had pursued to their legitimate conclusion and had shown to render all philosophy futile.[14] Only Kant in Germany was strong enough to carry the torch which Hume laid down. A more vigorous line was necessary for philosophy to escape the predicament in which Hume had left it. England, unfortunately, has not been able to profit by Hume's thought. Although he carried to their logical issue notions which are still commonplaces with educated English-

[10] *Works,* III, 124.
[11] Dewey, "Phil. of Green," *Andover Rev.,* II, 341.
[12] *Works,* III, 105f.
[13] *ibid.,* I, 375.
[14] *ibid.,* I, 2.

men, they have refused to open their eyes to his conclusions. It is thus necessary, in considering the english empirical tradition, to distinguish two kinds of failures—those which are so because they continue to work a played out vein, and those which in their failure have brought out a new truth. The associationalists, positivists and physical psychologists represent the former; Locke, Berkeley, and Hume the latter.[15] The English have done nothing to solve the metaphysical problem put by Hume's *Treatise,* but have merely dropped metaphysics to occupy themselves with a psychology which, of necessity, is metaphysical still, but " with the metaphysics of a pre-Kantian or even of a pre-Berkeleian age." [16]

Green saw that these difficulties could be overcome only by being traced to their source. If the English are to understand Kant and Hegel, or any valid idealism, they must see the *impasse* which Hume reached and the necessity of a fresh start. Always better known in Germany than in England, Hume is absolutely the last word of the philosophy of Locke.[17] It is for this reason that Green's first important work was his two lengthy introductions to Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature.* It is the beginning of his ardent and whole-hearted attempt to change the course of english philosophy. Polemical, even evangelistic, his avowed aim is to divert the attentions of the younger generation of his countrymen " from the anachronistic systems prevalent among us to the study of Kant and Hegel." [18] Considering his motive, the keenness and coldness of his critical analysis is the more remarkable. He indulges in no external criticism, but his examination is of the men themselves, and not of them as tested by some other thinker.[19] Mercilessly, he uncovers every inconsistency, every shift in the meaning of terms; traces both ways the implications, till he can show the principles to rest on some absurdity or end in some contradiction.

ii

Whether Locke's conceptions are the result of his method, or whether his method presupposes his conceptions is a question of little significance to Green or to us. It is sufficient that, logically, the method is prior, and Locke took it to be so. Green properly

[15] *Works,* II, 5.
[16] *ibid.,* I, 375f.
[17] *ibid.,* III, 105f.
[18] *ibid.,* I, 371.
[19] *cp.* Dewey, *op. cit.,* p. 342.

begins, then, by finding the roots of all of Locke's errors in his method. This has two parts; the introspective and genetic, and Green proceeds to show their several implications. The object of Locke's investigation was to be " *his own* mind," something he could carry with him in a coach from Oxford to London, and his method was to consist in passive observation of what was going on within it.[20] It is from this introspective method that the embarrassments of his system flow.[21] He thought that he might know that which renders knowledge possible, that " thinking thing " he found in himself, as he knew any other object.[22] Hume employed the same imaginary process of " looking into his own breast " instead of the analysis of knowledge and morality. But it was Hume's function to exhibit the flaw in the method by following it with greater rigor.[23] Implied in this approach, and underlying it, is the conception of thought as a function of the organism. For Locke, " thought " meant simply a faculty of the " thinking thing " which each of us has within ourselves, a substance which sometimes operates and sometimes does not.[24] It can readily be seen how this view would force him into finding a real which would be what it is if thought were not.[25] It implies the failure to distinguish the psychological and logical facets of thought, and like its counterpart, " the plain historical method," it ignores the primacy of self-consciousness in all knowing.

2. The unfortunate consequence for Locke of this method of looking into his own mind for an account of knowledge, was that he had to make the individual consciousness give an answer to its interrogator as to the beginning of knowledge.[26] But the interrogator of consciousness finds just what he puts there and thus commits a *petitio principii* in deriving complex ideas of cause and substance, and the like, from that which already presupposes them.[27] In this case two inescapable contradictions are involved: (*a*) between primacy of self-conscious cognisance of a thing, as the beginning of possible knowledge, and the primacy of animal sensation in the history of the individual man; (*b*) between the

[20] *Works,* I, 6.
[21] *ibid.,* I, 7.
[22] *ibid.,* I, 109.
[23] *ibid.,* I, 7, 109.
[24] *ibid.,* I, 111.
[25] *vide ibid.,* I, 84.
[26] *ibid.,* I, 11.
[27] *ibid.,* I, 14.

primacy in knowledge of the ideas of cause and substance, and the seeming gradual attainment of these "abstractions" by the individual intellect.[28] In short, since consciousness is to be known like any other object of knowledge, the use of the genetic method implies that at every stage, as far back in imagination as one may go, one must find in it those formal conceptions involved in all knowing.[29] That is precisely what Locke does, for in order to make the idea in its primitive simplicity the sign of a thing, he has to read into the very rudiments of knowledge such inventions of the mind as substance, cause, and relation.[30]

Locke's *tabula rasa* is the logical outcome of this method, and the "metaphor, interpreted as a fact, becomes the basis of his system." [31] But the stage on which the rise of knowledge is to be exhibited, is not set until a world of bodies has been conjured into existence, by which the empty mind is to be furnished. Having everything ready, it is easy for Locke to trace the genesis of knowledge, out of impressions on the "outward parts" and such impressions carried to the brain. But the whole theory rests on the confusion between the object of consciousness and the supposed physical conditions of consciousness.[32] Hume's problem has now arisen. If the mind is purely passive, if it cannot originate, how can it invent those relations which are neither given ideas, nor combinations of them? Locke never saw the necessity of this question because he always read these relations into a *datum* of which ideas are the appearances.[33] Having to make the origin of knowledge intelligible, he uses physics to account for it. Instead of telling us what consciousness is to itself at the beginning, by his impossible method of introspection, he tells what it is to the natural philosopher.[34] This, however, merely begs the question, and Berkeley's important contribution was to show the invalidity of such an assumption.[35]

Hume employs the genetic method, bequeathed to him by Locke, in tracing the process by which simple feeling generates "ideas of philosophical relation." Green believes that though

[28] *Works,* I, 12.
[29] *ibid.,* I, 27.
[30] *ibid.,* I, 46.
[31] *ibid.,* I, 11.
[32] *ibid.,* I, 10.
[33] *ibid.,* I, 62.
[34] *ibid.,* I, 163.
[35] *vide ibid.,* I, 165.

Hume handles the method much more subtly, and achieves a semblance of success, the same fallacies are involved. He can only derive the latest consciousness from the supposed earliest, by interpreting the earliest in terms of the latest. He can only get relations out of sensations, "impressions," he calls them, by first putting them in. Suspicion is thus created that a natural history of self-consciousness is impossible, "since such a history must be of events, and self-consciousness is not reducible to a series of events; being already at its beginning formally, or potentially, or implicitly all that it becomes actually or explicitly in developed knowledge." [36] Hume's own attempts are a sufficient indication of this, and should have been a warning to all who have since tried to give "natural histories" of the soul. When he has to account for the idea of extension he derives it from the impressions of colored points, disposed in a certain manner. But this "simply tells us that having seen things extended we consider their extension, and upon considering it acquire an idea of it." [37] In speaking of such an impression, is he not "introducing a 'fiction of thought' into the impression just as much as in calling it a 'perception of body'?" [38] In trying to identify extension with feeling, he shows more clearly the futility of the attempt.[39]

[36] *Works,* I, 166.
[37] *ibid.,* I, 202.
[38] *ibid.,* I, 203.
[39] *ibid.,* I, 213. It may be objected here that Hume's view of sensation is nearer the modern view of James, Bradley, or Köhler, than is that of Green. It is true that Green never escaped the atomistic sensationalism of Locke or Kant. The passage here referred to (Hume, *Treatise,* I, ii, 3) seems essentially in accord with the view of perception found, for example, in Gestalt Psychology. The starting point of this psychology is "the observation that sensory fields are replete with qualities and properties which one neglects if one takes 'sensations' as their sole content. . . ." (Köhler, Gestalt Psychology, p. 187.) Does Hume's theory not seem to be a recognition on his part of the doctrine, expressed by James, that "relations of every sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are . . . ?" (*Plural. Univ.,* p. 279f.) That it may so be taken cannot be denied, but that it is consistent with Hume's general position few would care to admit. His whole system rested on the sharp separation between impressions and ideas, the latter being somehow the work of the mind. But not allowing the mind to originate, he had to read them back into impressions of sensation to account for them. The inconsistency of the above passage with his theory of sensation is patent when it is compared with that in which he is making away with the idea of substance. "If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived

In conclusion, an epistemological dualism—the gratuitous fiction of the "double existence of perceptions and objects"—with all its confusions and perplexities is the beginning and end of Locke's method.[40] Although Hume wisely denied Locke's dualism he did not do so for the right reasons. He met it only by the further obliteration of the distinction between feeling and felt thing.[41] It is thus that every effort fails to trace a genesis of knowledge out of anything which is not, in form and principle, knowledge itself.[42] Locke's "historical, plain method," then, is no more satisfactory than his attempt to look into his own understanding "to see how it wrought."[43]

3. Locke, as we have seen, conceived his mind as a "thinking thing," born with and dependent on a particular animal organism.[44] Thus in attempting to examine knowledge by looking into this mind—instead of at the object of knowledge, the world of interrelated objects—and seeking its origin in that which was not it, he was inevitably led to a hopeless and all-pervading confusion between the psychological and the logical, between the flow or stream of consciousness and the world that consciousness presents. This is seen in his equivocal use of the term "idea." At one time it is an impression of the mind, at another, a quality or a thing.[45] It is the confusion between feeling and felt thing, between sensation

by the eyes, it must be a colour. . . ." (*Treatise*, I, i, 6.) That is sufficient to indicate Hume's cavalier method in dealing with sensations and relations. James' criticism of Green for his "atomistic and unrelated sensations," the "fictitious products of his rationalistic fancy," is sound enough, but it may be urgently denied that this in any way affects Green's criticism of the empiricists. James is absurd in finding pathetic Green's "belaboring of poor old Locke for not having first seen that his ideas of sensation were just that impracticable sort of thing." (*op. cit.*, p. 279.) It was Green's merit to have shown these contradictions in empiricism, even though his way out of them is no longer acceptable.

[40] *vide Works*, I, 261.

[41] *ibid.*, I, 261f.

[42] *Proleg.*, sect. 70.

[43] *Essay*, I, i, 2; Second Letter to Bishop of Worcester.

[44] For a discussion of these opposed views of "mind" or the "human understanding" see the attack on Green's criticism of Locke made by Knox. (*Mind*, N.S., XXIII, 337.) Knox realised the world of difference between the "human understanding" that Locke looked into, and mind, as subject of which the world is object of knowledge, that Green was considering. Unfortunately, he didn't comprehend the distinction upon which Green's criticism was based.

[45] In later writers, "phenomenon" is used in the same equivocal way.

and perception, and Green insists that only through this confusion does the empirical philosophy acquire its plausibility. If the simple idea, as the original of knowledge, is a mere feeling, the genesis of knowledge from it has to be explained; if it is a thing or quality of a thing, the nascent intelligence is virtually endowed with the concept of substance.[46] Locke, like his followers, failed utterly to master the distinction between the metaphysical question; "What is the simplest element of knowledge?" and the physiological one; What are the conditions of knowledge in the individual human organism?[47] We may speak of consciousness as a stream, but it has to be something other than a stream if it is to give knowledge of related facts, which are not in succession.[48] Locke was able to obliterate this distinction by practically separating in his thoughts "the conceived content or object from the conception, and imagining it vaguely as residing elsewhere than in consciousness." He was thus able to avoid the question, how an object determined by relations can exist in a consciousness which consists in a series of occurrences.[49] This confusion, at the basis of all commonsense theory, has its far-reaching consequences in the disastrous separation of reality from the work of the mind.

Locke escaped the predicament in which he was placed by his truncated psychological conception of the understanding, only by making the simple idea, the momentary isolated consciousness, the representation of a thing determined by relations to other things in an order of nature.[50] Berkeley, having legitimately enough removed Locke's "external" world, should then have faced the question how a consciousness, composed of feelings, of which one is over before the other begins, could constitute or represent a world of permanent relations, and the further question, how are knowledge or reality possible without permanent relations?[51]

Hume always sidestepped the difficulty by reading into the impression the work of thought, while maintaining that thought (the idea) can only faintly copy feeling. Thus he speaks of the impression of a man, of a globe, and so forth, without realising that "such an interpretation of the supposed *datum* of sense would have been to elevate thought from the position which Hume as-

[46] *Works*, I, 13.

[47] *ibid.*, I, 19.

[48] *Proleg.*, sect. 56.

[49] *ibid.*, sect. 58.

[50] *Works*, I, 52.

[51] *ibid.*, I, 143.

signed to it, as a 'decaying sense,' to that of being itself the organiser of the world which he knows." [52] Instead, he set himself to reduce relations to impressions or to dismiss them as tendencies to suppose.[53] In the former, sense is made one with thought, which is altogether absurd if each feeling is considered "'in itself'" as a "'separate and perishing existence.'" [54] That Hume is not consistent with his own premises is clearly brought out in his concluding idea of the mind "'as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other.'" [55] As Green asserts, we could scarcely desire a better "*definition of nature*" than this, or one more charged with the "fictions of thought." [56] With this we need but compare another account of the mind that Hume gives, in which it is "but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement," [57] to see the contradictions this confusion of the psychological and the logical aspects of the mind involved. Both points of view are valid and legitimate but neither can be taken to represent the other.[58]

4. The absolute separation of reality from the work of the mind is, as we have seen, a necessary result of Locke's psychological view of mind. In answering the question as to the relation between thought, as in each man, and the world which he does not make, Locke could but conclude that the real world does not come and go with each man's fleeting consciousness. But not having recognised the distinction between consciousness as fleeting, and consciousness as permanent, or between feeling and thought, he comes to regard the real world as the absolute opposite of thought and its work. Simple ideas are real because "we cannot make one to ourselves," but the work of the mind, on the other hand, he considers arbitrary. For Locke, "a man has but to think, and he

[52] *Works*, I, 183.
[53] *ibid.*, I, 238f.
[54] *ibid.*, I, 239, 267.
[55] *ibid.*, I, 298f.
[56] *ibid.*, I, 299.
[57] *Treatise*, I, iv, 6, iv.
[58] In morals, hedonism is the product of this same confusion. Reason is allowed no more place in the constitution of objects that determine desire than it is allowed in the constitution of objects of perception. Thus the "moral faculty" becomes simply a particular susceptibility of pleasure and pain. (*Works*, I, 311.)

can make ideas of relation for himself as he pleases." [59] Thus, as Green shows, it is not the work of the mind, as such, that he opposes to the real, "but the work of the mind as assumed to be arbitrary and irregularly changing." [60]

Locke begins with existence as simple consciousness, but ends with it as reality. It is given only in those ideas with whose origin the mind has nothing to do, and since relations of any kind cannot be represented as given in simple consciousness, they have to be pronounced not to exist, and thus to be unreal or "fictions of the mind." He failed to realise that without these relations there could be no knowledge.[61] The trouble is that just where the opposition between things of the mind and real existence is most insisted upon, the work of thought inevitably obtrudes itself in the place of real existence.[62] In other words, having distinguished between the given and the invented, Locke has to interpret the given in terms of the invented.[63] This step is unavoidable in all philosophies that attempt to find the real outside of the work of thought.

If Locke were consistent, real existence could belong only to the simple idea, the present momentary act of consciousness; to a thing as distinct from presentation to consciousness it could not belong, for such a thing implies relations, that is, inventions of the mind.[64] A consequence of this doctrine, if logically carried out, is to make the "really existent" unmeaning—something about which nothing at all can be said. The empiricists, as a result of not carrying out their doctrine to its logical conclusion, do not see that "a consistent sensationalism must be speechless." Locke, however, as Green says, was not the man "to become speechless out of sheer consistency." [65] The outcome of this doctrine, with the theory of thought as abstraction which accompanies it, is that the further we think the further removed we become from the real.

Locke tried to save himself from attributing reality to the momentary presentations to consciousness by asserting that our knowledge "is real only so far as there is a conformity between

[59] *Proleg.*, sect. 21.
[60] *loc. cit.*
[61] *Works*, I, 25.
[62] *ibid.*, I, 27.
[63] *ibid.*, I, 55.
[64] *ibid.*, I, 35.
[65] *ibid.*, I, 36.

our ideas and the reality of things." [66] Locke himself recognised the difficulty of this criterion, but thought to escape it by making simple ideas "the natural and regular productions of things without us; really acting upon us." [67] This was only possible, however, by converting the simple sensation into a perception, that is, determining it by relations which are the work of the mind.[68]

His method of finding the real consisted in abstracting from the formed content of consciousness till that which could not be got rid of was reached.[69] This was the momentary present relation of subject and object, and even in it the "fiction of thought" still survives. Locke made the mistake of thinking that he could take away all relations and still have, over against the world of knowledge, the work of the mind, a real world of which we can say nothing but that it is there and that it makes itself felt in every sensation.[70] Green's query is simply whether anything makes itself felt in a sensation, apart from intellectual interpretation; whether the abstract residuum of consciousness has anything at all to report.[71]

It was Berkeley's contribution to recognise Locke's inconsistency concerning the real. He tried to refute materialism by showing that matter was not reducible to simple feeling, and was thus a superinduction of the mind, a departure from the real. This was valid enough, and a worthy step in advance, but it logically gave Berkeley no God, and left him with the further question as to how a mind that cannot originate could arrive at such superinductions or fictions.[72] Hume, while avoiding Locke's reference of ideas to something external, had the same difficulty with truth and reality. To say that a feeling is true while it lasts is to deny truth altogether, and to leave nothing at all to be real.[73]

The full and only possible consequence of Locke's philosophy, then, as well as of any philosophy that goes outside of thought for the real, is that it involves the unreality of every object of which anything can be said. The only remedy for this *contretemps,* lies

[66] *Essay,* IV, iv, 3.
[67] *ibid.,* IV, iv, 4.
[68] *Works,* I, 44.
[69] *ibid.,* I, 77.
[70] *ibid.,* I, 93.
[71] *ibid.,* I, 70.
[72] *ibid.,* I, 135.
[73] *ibid.,* I, 187.

in the "definite substitution of full intelligibility of relations for present sensibility, as the true account of the real. . . ." [74]

5. Green wishes to show that Locke's confused notion of the real involves him in the peculiar predicament of having to make a distinction between the real and the unreal, between reality and appearance, without having any true basis for it. He is a victim, like many other moderns, of the crude logic, often ascribed to Plato, in which there are objects described as μὴ ὄντα which stand in the same relation to ignorance as τὰ ὄντα to knowledge.[75] The very question itself, as to what is real, is misleading, since it implies an unreal from which the real can be distinguished. Locke's attempt to distinguish between the real as the work of nature and the fantastic as the work of man cannot serve, for two important reasons. The first difficulty with it is seen in his attempt to find "certain real knowledge" as the agreement of our ideas with the "reality of things." The very raising of such a question implies the impossibility of answering it. The question is meaningless unless reality is something other than our ideas, and unanswerable unless it is, or is given in, our ideas.[76] The further difficulty is that we can be conscious of an idea as the work of nature, in opposition to the work of man, only by being conscious of it under relations which, according to Locke, are the inventions of man—relations of substance and quality, cause and effect, identity and difference. In short, the simple idea can only testify to being real, that is, the work of nature, by being clothed with relations that are the work of man.[77]

The same self-contradictions by which a "creation of the mind" creeps into the real or given, also appear in Locke's account

[74] *Works,* I, 160. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that there is nothing in Green's doctrine of reality, or his criticism of the empirical treatment of it, that could be taken to be in opposition to the metaphysical systems of such philosophers as Plotinos, Scotus Erigena, Boehme or F. H. Bradley. These agree in finding a real outside of discursive thought, but they do not fail to recognise it as such. What we may call the real is ultimately a matter of taste, and Green finds it elsewhere than in the "One," God, or "immediate experience." But the essence of his teaching, in perfect accord with the thinkers just mentioned, is that we cannot at once find a real outside of thought and then qualify it by attributes applicable only in the realm of discourse.
[75] *Proleg.,* sect. 22.
[76] *Works,* I, 49.
[77] *ibid.,* I, 52.

of the real itself.[78] Though simple ideas, for example, are necessarily real, it develops that they are truly so, not in their simplicity, but only as related to an external thing producing them. Thus he makes relation constitute reality, however inconsistent it is with his theory, but wrongly limits it to the one relation of externality. It must be noted as highly significant that Locke made a complete *volte face* when he found the reality of mathematical ideas in that sole relation to the mind as its products, which he had previously made the source of unreality. The logical conclusion this forces upon us, but which he did not make himself, is "that unreality does not lie in either relation as opposed to the other, but in the confusion of any relation with another." [79]

It can hardly be expected that on the basis of these confusions Locke could satisfactorily differentiate between perception and hallucination. If liveliness and involuntariness of ideas are the sole criteria of their reality, our dreams must be as real as the perceptions of our waking state. The reality of an apparition, for example, lies for Green in certain relations, say between the circulation of the blood and the organs of sight, as distinct from the reality in the normal relations of sight. As so interpreted, there is nothing unreal about it. Locke's doctrine, however, could allow for no such distinction, for "however interpreted, the liveliness and the involuntariness of the idea remain the same, as does its relation to an efficient cause." [80] It is manifest that Locke's tests of reality are inadequate, and require a change in one of two directions. Either the production of ideas by an external thing as the condition of their reality must be given up, as Locke himself did, unknowingly, in his doctrine of mathematics, or further differentia than liveliness and involuntariness must be added.

Berkeley tried the same sort of external reference of real ideas and could not escape Locke's difficulties. Whereas Locke referred them to matter, Berkeley attributed them to God. In so doing he got himself on the logical see-saw of explaining God as the efficient cause of real ideas, and real ideas as those which God produces, in distinction from those we make ourselves.[81] Like Locke, further, he realised that tests of reality other than knowledge of the cause were essential, if we are to properly distinguish

[78] *Works*, I, 60.
[79] *ibid.*, I, 154.
[80] *ibid.*, I, 154.
[81] *ibid.*, I, 155.

the real from the apparent, truth from falsity. But when he tries to escape by subjective tests, and adds "'steadiness, order, and coherence'" to Locke's liveliness and involuntariness, he is making "idea" mean not feeling—for a feeling is neither coherent nor incoherent—but conceived relations of feelings, the intellectual interpretation of them. Strictly followed out, coherence as the test that ideas are real, rather than represent the real, amounts to an identification of the real with the work of thought.[82]

Thus is distinctly brought out the impossibility, in any dualistic system, of distinguishing appearance from reality, falsity from truth, and the impossibility of doing so in any "idealistic" system which finds reality in simple feeling and denies it to the work of thought. It is futile to attempt to define the real by distinction from anything else, and invalid to make an antithesis between reality and the work of the mind. The first implies a not-real from which the real can be distinguished; the second leaves nothing to be real about which anything can be said.[83] In short, we cannot go outside of our ideas for truth, nor find truth in our ideas unless they are taken to be conceived relations rather than impressions of sense. The fact is that the very attempt to distinguish the real from the apparent implies the notion of nature as a single, all-inclusive, system of relations.[84]

6. Involved in Locke's genesis of knowledge and his inadequate conception of the real is a misconception of the process of knowledge. General and complex ideas are the workmanship of the mind, a workmanship consisting in "the abstraction of ideas from each other, and from that to which they are related as qualities." [85] But unless these relations are given in the original experience they can in no manner be held to be abstracted from it. The idea of substance, for example, is abstracted, according to Locke, from the ideas of sensation and reflection, but these are ideas of "something" and as such are real, while the idea of substance is an invention. But it is hard to distinguish the idea of something from the idea of substance, and thus the latter is the condition of the very reality of the ideas to which it is opposed.[86] The difficulty of this circle is apparent at once and will be seen to be a snag upon which Mill ran more than once.

[82] *Works*, I, 155.
[83] *Proleg.*, sect. 24.
[84] *ibid.*, sect. 26.
[85] *Works*, I, 40.
[86] *loc. cit.*

The remedy can be found in the distinction between the complex and confused, between abstraction and analysis. It is the confused that is originally given in experience, but to us it is simple, has no definite content, because till it has been analysed, nothing can be said of it, even though in itself it is infinitely complex. The true process of knowledge, then, begins with the complex and ends with it: "begins with that which is in itself the fulness of reality, but which only becomes so for us as it is gradually spelt out by our analysis." [87] Such a conception of knowledge does not correct Locke but completely changes his doctrine.[88] It nullifies Locke's easy method of "sending a man to his senses" for the discovery of reality, and his method of tracing the genesis of knowledge in the individual consciousness. "Such consciousness can tell nothing of its own beginning, if of this beginning, as of the purely indefinite, nothing can be said; if it only becomes defined through relations, which in its state of primitive potentiality are not actually in it." [89] Just as the baffling problems of epistemology arise out of Locke's view of thought, they disappear with this notion through its use of the aristotelian concepts of actuality and potentiality.

Hume, making the idea simply a copy of the impression, individualises the impression by qualities which Locke had ascribed to the substance found in nature. This having been done, he transfers these qualities to the idea, the "weaker impression." Thought becomes a "decaying sense" only through our ignoring its work in the successive synthesis of perception.[90] The great dilemma of empiricism has resulted from Locke's conception of the process of knowledge—real things being first found and then relations being superinduced by the mind. Hume, making Locke's method more

[87] *Works,* I, 41; *cp.* Aristotle, *Physics,* I, i, 184a 23.

[88] That Green is right as against Locke can scarcely be denied, but the question may well be raised as to the position of this doctrine in Green's own system. His "atomistic" sensations, to which he allows no relational element whatsoever, not even succession; his ascription to self-conscious thought of all relations; and the resultant refusal to allow sensation any place in knowledge, do not agree with this account of the knowledge process. With this doctrine as its foundation, Green's system would be greatly other than it is. It would be much nearer Bradley than Kant. For as Locke's breaking up of the manifold of sense into distinct and isolated elements, made Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception" necessary, this conception renders it superfluous.

[89] *Works,* I, 41.

[90] *ibid.,* I, 182f.

nearly consistent with itself, left no mind to superinduce them. Absolute consistency would have left nothing upon which relations could be superinduced.

Just as Locke misconceived the process of knowledge, he wrongly defined it. His definition of it, as "the perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas" makes knowledge of cause and effect impossible. Locke had a partial suspicion of this, but it was Hume who clearly perceived that relations of causation and identity, as well as ideas of space and time, are not objects of knowledge, since they "depend not on ideas compared together, but may be changed without any change in the ideas." [91] But whenever "matters of fact" can be treated as relations between present sensations, Locke treats them as matter of knowledge even though they do not consist in agreement of ideas any more than does causation. Logically carried through, the particular experiment in physics would no more be knowledge than the general principles Locke and Hume discard. It never occurs to them to ask how much of this experiment is present sensation or what are the ideas that agree.[92]

7. Locke's commonsense philosophy involves him in the naïve realism which holds ideas as copies of things without us. His profound recognition that all knowledge is of ideas could not fit into the same system with the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. How are primary qualities outside the mind, yet knowable? Locke's escape lay in a figure of speech—the figure of the wax or the mirror.[93] As Green himself suggests, the criticism of the empirical tradition in England could well begin with Bacon. His notion of knowledge as a mirror held up to the world is very like Locke's belief that primary qualities "are in bodies whether we perceive them or no," [94] and that "the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them." [95] The real as body must be outside consciousness, while yet our mind "hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate." [96] Body must thus be brought within consciousness by the supposition that it has qualities which copy themselves in our ideas.[97]

[91] *Works,* I, 240.

[92] *loc. cit.*

[93] *ibid.,* I, 81.

[94] *Essay,* II, viii, 23.

[95] *ibid.,* II, viii, 15.

[96] *ibid.,* IV, i, 1.

[97] *Works,* I, 80f.

This physical theory of perception that ideas are somehow like things is brought to a crux by Locke's sending a man to his senses for the idea of solidity, while yet defining it as a quality of bodies.[98]

The criticism of Berkeley and Hume naturally fastened itself first on this most obvious departure from the "new way of ideas." Primary qualities can no more be attributed to bodies than secondary, for it rests on a distinction not given in simple feeling itself.[99] Berkeley asked how an idea can be like anything that is not an idea. Green makes the question stronger—"how can an idea be like that of which the sole and simple determination is just that it is not an idea?"—and thus shows that it is unanswerable.[100] The whole doctrine rests on the false antithesis between body as it is in itself and body as it is for us, whereas Locke's only legitimate distinction would lie between body as it is given in actual sensation and body as it is in conception.[101] It is a logical result of the genetic method and the *tabula rasa.*

8. Further difficulties brought about by Locke's false start are found in his theory that mathematical and moral propositions are real and yet not trifling. Having posited that the singular proposition alone can represent the operation of a substance upon us, all general propositions concerning substances are trifling, as being merely the analyses of nominal essences, or are instructive but uncertain, as being but the compendia of a number of past events, and thus not truly universal.[102] But the knowledge expressed in mathematical and moral propositions is real—there being no reality for it to *mis*represent—and instructive because the predicate is not contained in the subject, although a necessary consequence of it.[103] The contradiction is that while derivation from material given in simple feeling renders ideas of substances unreal in contrast with their real "originals," it actually constitutes the reality of mathematical and moral propositions. "Their relation to an original disappears; they are themselves archetypes, from which the mind, by its own act, can elicit other ideas not already involved in the meaning of their names."[104] This doctrine raises three questions which Locke's philosophy cannot answer. First, it attributes an

[98] *Works,* I, 82; *Essay,* II, iii, 1; II, iv, 1.
[99] *Works,* I, 81.
[100] *ibid.,* I, 81f.
[101] *ibid.,* I, 80.
[102] *ibid.,* II, 3f.
[103] *ibid.,* I, 97f.
[104] *ibid.,* I, 98.

originative function to the mind; for how can a mind, purely passive, which can unite only what it has found in separation, and separate again what it has united, originate "instructive propositions?" Secondly, if reality consists in what is given from without in simple feeling, how can these propositions be *really* true? Thirdly, how can these propositions have no archetypes other than themselves when they deal with number and magnitude, which are primary qualities of bodies?[105]

Green's criticism fastens itself upon the first two of these questions, and attempts to show that both Locke's doctrine of reality and his theory of the mind as passive are overthrown by his attribution of real knowledge to mathematical propositions. In the latter, which grants an originative function to the mind, the refutation of Locke's empiricism is to be found. It rendered inevitable Kant's question as to synthetic judgments *a priori,* which was to lead to the recognition of thought as constituting the objective world and to the removal of the antithesis between thought and reality.[106]

Locke admitted the real generality of mathematical truths but did not face its consequences. Hume, having seen the difficulty, refused to admit the real generality.[107] Although he wisely disallowed the distinction between propositions which do and those which do not "concern existence," the question is whether, apart from ideas of relation which are not simple impressions, even singular propositions are possible for him. If not, the distinction between singular and general disappears, and the exclusion of the latter is groundless.[108] His destruction of mathematical certainty becomes complete when he holds that the mathematician in speaking of certain lines as never meeting is either making untrue statements, or is speaking of nonentities of which he supposes the existence.[109] Without attending to Hume's doctrine of number, it is sufficient to note that, consistent with his method, he cannot allow ideas exactly corresponding to our mathematical definitions, for all ideas are fainter impressions, and no appearances to the eye correspond to our definitions. Green's retort is that "If they do not *exactly* answer, they might as well for the purposes of mathe-

[105] *Works,* I, 98; II, 4.
[106] *ibid.,* I, 99.
[107] *ibid.,* I, 100.
[108] *ibid.,* I, 185f.
[109] *ibid.,* II, 5.

matical demonstration not answer at all." [110] All these confusions over the reality of the objects of mathematical definitions—confusions which end in accounting for the exactness and universality of mathematical truths on the ground that they are hypothetical—will be seen in detail in the criticism of Mill. What we regret in Hume is not that he carried his doctrine too far, but that he did not carry it far enough to see that it excluded not only ideas exactly answering to mathematical definitions, but all ideas of quantitative relations whatever.[111]

iii

Before passing on to Green's criticism of Kant and his own contemporaries, it will be well to survey some of the more important results of his criticism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, as underlying his whole attitude towards empiricism.

Locke's great contribution was that he showed once for all that knowledge is a matter of ideas; that the object-matter of all philosophy, physical or metaphysical, is in some sort consciousness. That Green should have insisted on this may seem strange to students of the positivism of the last century, for that all knowledge is of phenomena was one of their cardinal doctrines. But as Green asserts, it is of value only so far as to its users it is more than a mere phrase. "To enter into its meaning is the true baptism into philosophy." [112] To realise the distinction between understanding it and merely employing it, we have but to compare Schopenhauer's "The world is my idea," with Mill's statement of Comte's philosophy, "We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena," which is shortly followed with "The laws of phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature, their ultimate causes, . . . are unknown and inscrutable to us." [113] Locke, in his better moments, saw that reality could be found nowhere but in consciousness. This left for a more thorough analysis no alternative between finding reality in relations of thought, and thus immutable, and submitting it to such subdivisions of time as exclude all coexistence.[114] Locke's inconsistency lay in combining with the proposition that the only world

[110] *Works,* I, 233.
[111] *loc. cit.*
[112] *ibid.,* I, 377; *cp.* I, 70.
[113] *Comte and Positivism,* London, 5th ed., p. 6.
[114] *Works,* I, 79.

we can know is the world of "ideas," the other one that thought cannot originate ideas. This left Hume with the task of so manipulating "impressions and ideas" as to make a succession of feelings into a knowledge of things and their relations.[115] He thus avoided Locke's dualism but can scarcely be said to have left us with any knowledge worthy of the name.

As Locke held that the essence of a thing, in the only sense in which we can know or intelligibly speak of it, is the meaning of its name, he limited knowledge to an analysis of nominal essence. His theory of essence, though it did effectively distinguish between things and the meaning of words, left the analysis of the latter as the only possible function of knowledge, at least for his more logical disciple. It is amusing that this very movement accredited to Bacon, that was to free philosophy from the scholastic bondage of words for the fruitful discipline of facts, was so soon to end in leaving the analysis of the meaning of words as the sole function of knowledge.[116]

Locke very rightly suspected that a science of nature was impossible, according to his principles. It is the necessary result of his doctrine of nominal essence.[117] Though we may enumerate a number of past matters-of-fact about water, these cannot be gathered up in any general statement about it as a real existence, for as soon as that is done, we pass from water as a real existence to its "nominal essence." [118] There can thus be no general knowledge from particular experiments, and further, if we restrict "real existence" to an "actual present sensation," we find that reality is perpetually disappearing into the unreality of thought.[119]

This whole theory conflicts with the actual knowledge mankind supposes itself to have attained,[120] and yet it is the accepted foundation of the logic of Mill which seeks a science of nature in the methodical discovery and proof of general propositions concerning matter of fact.[121] A new theory of experience, and another doctrine of reality, are needed if the procedure of science is to be justified. It is the condemnation of the doctrine of Locke and

[115] *Works,* I, 238.
[116] *ibid.,* I, 64.
[117] *ibid.,* I, 67f.
[118] *ibid.,* I, 68f.
[119] *ibid.,* I, 69f.
[120] *ibid.,* I, 64.
[121] *ibid.,* I, 68.

Hume that, according to it, experience is not a possible parent of science. Here, again, it is seen that the "idealism" which Green opposes to the empiricism of his english predecessors and contemporaries is not a philosophy that goes beyond experience but is one that seeks a theory of experience adequate to explain the methods and conclusions of the science man possesses.

Another burden to be charged to the philosophy of Locke is the puzzle of epistemology that is its consequence. Misled by the phrase "idea of a thing," we suppose each to have a separate reality. From this inevitably follow the riddles as to how the idea can represent the thing, how the ideas of primary qualities can be copies of them, and how from the real individual thing of experience a general idea can be abstracted.[122] Once thought and its object have been separated, they can never again be brought together. There is only a "problem" of knowledge if one is set up to begin with by artificial barriers between thought and thing.

Positively, an examination of the empirical tradition forces upon us the recognition of thought as constituting the real world, the recognition of the empirical itself as ideal.[123] We must conclude that only the thing as thought of, and through thought individualised by the relations which constitute its community with the universe, is the real. We can escape Locke's dilemmas only by recognising the real as an intellectual order or mind.[124] The remedy for his embarrassments as to reality and the work of the mind is to be found in a substitution of full intelligibility of relations for present sensibility as a true account of the real.[125] This avoids the absurdity of making anything intelligible unreal. A philosophy which is to be consistent with itself cannot regard objects as something apart from their relations, cannot hold for facts without inference.[126]

Further, we find that a self-conscious subject is implied in "Nature"—is logically carried with the recognition of a system of nature.[127] A succession of feelings cannot themselves give the idea of succession, nor likewise that of resemblance.[128] A self is necessary, a principle of integration—Kant's unity of apperception—if the succession of impressions is to give an idea of that succession, or relations of likeness or unlikeness. Hume's difficulty in accounting for time indicates that it requires a retaining and combining thought, other than the succession of feelings, a consciousness not in succession.[129] In fact, self-consciousness is necessary for the perception of an object with qualities, for to have such perception "is to be conscious of relation between a subject and an object, of which neither perishes with the moment of perception."[130] Unless man were more than a passive receiver of impressions, unless he could consciously detach himself from nature, unless he were all that is implied in the term "self-conscious subject" no *Treatise of Human Nature* could have been written at all.[131]

Green goes further, and maintains that God is implied in the conception of nature, of a world to be known, for knowledge is only possible as the progressive actualisation in us of a self-consciousness in itself complete, and which in its completeness includes the world as its object.[132] Berkeley's fallacy lay in making the mind of God an arbitrary will of a creator that this feeling shall follow that, instead of an intelligible order by which our feelings may be interpreted.[133] The only possible "proof" of the being of God, Green insists, lies in the conception that the world only exists as thought of, and of God as the self-conscious subject in relation to which alone an intelligible world can exist, and the presence of which in us is the condition of our knowing it.[134]

These conclusions represent the complete revolution Green worked in english philosophic thought. It is patent that such a reconstruction was necessary, if philosophy was to escape from the narrow bounds the lockeian analysis of knowledge had placed upon it. If Green's own doctrine appears partially or largely unacceptable, the fault can hardly be placed on his religious zeal or his ardent spirit of moral reform, but must rather be laid to his failure to completely reorientate himself as against the philosophy he was attacking.

[122] *Works*, I, 141.
[123] *ibid.*, I, 188.
[124] *ibid.*, I, 141, 91.
[125] *ibid.*, I, 160.
[126] *ibid.*, I, 250, 281f.
[127] *ibid.*, I, 299.
[128] *ibid.*, I, 144, 175f.
[129] *Works*, I, 217, 219.
[130] *ibid.*, I, 199.
[131] *ibid.*, III, 112.
[132] *ibid.*, I, 131.
[133] *ibid.*, I, 153.
[134] *ibid.*, I, 156.

II

THE CRITICAL REACTION: KANT

i

As we have seen, Green considered Kant to be the true successor of Hume, in contradistinction to the pseudo-humeians who, while pretending to follow Hume, introduced elements into their systems altogether foreign to, and inconsistent with, Hume's speculations.

Green fully recognised the residua of empiricism in Kant's philosophy, and saw the inconsistencies and errors into which they led him. He sought scrupulously to remove all such remnants and their results from Kant's system. Unfortunately, he was not in a position to ask the more significant question, whether Kant's whole system may not have been conditioned by its empirical roots or influence, and thus to see the need or possibility of an entirely fresh start, unhampered by Locke's conception of mind and the knowledge process. For it was Locke's breaking up of sensation [1] that made Kant's "synthetic unity of apperception" necessary, and Locke's attempted dichotomy of sensation and relation that required the elaborate psychological machinery of Kant to mediate between them.

For Green, Kant's relation to the english commonsense philosophy of feeling was comparable to the opposition of Plato to the Sophists. And, as with Plato, the moral interest was paramount.[2] His question, of which his whole philosophy is an attempted answer, "How are experience and moral action possible?" recalls the simpler one, "What is justice, and how do we come by the idea of it?" which forms the text of the *Republic*.[3] Freed by Hume from his presuppositions, Kant started the new method of philosophy, which, by its recognition of the constructive energy of reason, was the grave of all the natural histories of knowledge and morals which had been prevalent theretofore.[4]

[1] *vide Essay*, II, ii, 1.
[2] *Works*, III, 96.
[3] *ibid.*, III, 93.
[4] *ibid.*, III, 114.

Man, being set free from the "artificial impotence of his own false logic," is qualified "for a complete interpretation of his own achievement in knowledge and morality." [5]

The English were not in a position to understand Kant because they did not see the need of the questions he asked. His doctrine is not in conflict with the psychology of association because it is dealing with a question which is logically prior, the question as to the conditions of the possibility of the original connected consciousness.[6] But for these psychologists it was an unpardonable sin to ask "what were the conditions under which an intelligent experience is possible" since it necessarily implies that they cannot be derived from experience. Therewith Kant is set down as a "metempiric" a "transcendentalist," one who professed to "'evolve intuitions out of his own consciousness,'" to be conversant with "'a world beyond experience,'" to know things by some inner light. And they can explain his curious illusions by the fact that he lived before the "discovery" of the hereditary transmission of certain beliefs, and thus held them to be independent of experience. Green's conclusion is that "The nature of the problem with which he dealt, and the unity of his system, are thus alike misapprehended." [7]

Kant's professed followers, on the other hand, have misrepresented his teaching by appropriating him to their own purposes.[8] The unfortunate truth is that divers expositions of Kant's meaning alike find textual justification. The true question is one as to the extent and direction in which we are to "develop his meaning." In the letter of his statements there are "survivals of a way of thinking which it was the true result of his philosophy to set aside." [9] These are his inheritance from empiricism, and Green, though not avowedly, sets himself to excise everything in Kant which is not in keeping with the spirit of his more pregnant passages. The roots of all these inconsistencies are to be found in the commonsense philosophy of Locke.

[5] *Works*, I, 3.
[6] *ibid.*, II, 20f.
[7] *ibid.*, III, 128f.
[8] *ibid.*, III, 127f.
[9] *ibid.*, III, 148.

ii

Green finds Kant's speculation governed by three leading notions, all of which came to him through Locke and Hume. They all bear traces of their empirical ancestry and interfere with the true development of Kant's own conception of the knowledge process, which he never completely separated from that of ordinary logic. They are: (*a*) the separation of "object affecting the senses" and "mind" as independent existences, each contributing so much to knowledge; (*b*) division of judgments into universal and necessary on the one hand, and particular and contingent on the other, the first being the test that the judgment is the work of the mind, not the representation of an "affection of the senses"; (*c*) division of judgments into analytical and synthetical, two mutually exclusive classes.[10]

His "objects affecting the senses" correspond to Locke's "substances that operate on us whether we will or no"; his empirical judgments to Locke's "propositions concerning substances or coexistences"; his distinction between "synthetical" and "analytical" judgments, to Locke's of "instructive" and "trifling" propositions.[11] We shall take up these notions one by one and see the part Green finds each of them playing in the kantian philosophy.

1. At the basis of all of Kant's difficulties is the separation of the form and the matter of knowledge. For Kant does not keep clear of the mistake of supposing the "matter" of sensibility to be really something apart from the form, of supposing objects to be first felt and then relations added. It is the great mistake to be guarded against, and is implied in his dictum, "'Macht zwar der Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht.'" The understanding makes nature, in short, but out of material which consists of "data" of sensibility, which it does not make. In respect of its form as a nature it has its origin in understanding; in respect of the "matter" upon which the understanding works, an origin elsewhere. "This apparent ascription of nature to a twofold origin . . . cannot but strike us as unsatisfactory."[12] It leads to the separation of the categories and sensible intuitions, as constituting severally the form and matter of knowledge, and the hypostatization of them as independent existences.[13]

[10] *Works,* II, 2.
[11] *loc. cit.*
[12] *Proleg.,* sect. 11; *Works,* II, 5.
[13] *Works,* II, 35, 37.

Having achieved this separation, Kant must find a *tertium quid* to mediate between them, which he does in the "schemata." These are supposed to render possible the application of "pure conceptions" to sensible objects, but they are simply abstractions from the concrete reality of sense determined by thought, and thus cannot be spoken of as making thought possible.[14] It is the old empirical error of supposing objects to be given independently of thought,[15] which struggled in Kant against the conception of objects as given by the "unity of apperception."[16] Since it is not through sensation that objects are given, but through the unity of apperception as exercised upon sense, and since the categories are simply the forms of this unity, nothing is needed to mediate between them and objects. Had this been recognised, the categories would not have appeared in that separate form in which they are made to correspond to the classification of logical judgments—"which represents as little as the syllogism the process by which intelligent experience is formed."[17]

The most disastrous consequence of this notion carried over from empiricism is the distinction between intuition and conception, for besides all the resultant confusion concerning judgments, it leads to the "thing-in-itself" and the idea of a world of "phenomena" and another of "noumena."[18] "Intuition" with Kant is the presentation of a real individual object ("real" as phenomenon). "Conception" is the thought of an attribute or attributes possessed by such an object.[19] But how can these functions be separated? Kant constantly opposes "intuition" as that in which objects are given, to "conception" which takes them as given. Yet, from his account of "synthesis of recognition" it appears that without it "intuition" would not be intuition of an object at all; that though it might yield a mental image containing a multiplicity of parts, this image, without synthesis of recognition

[14] *Works,* II, 37.
[15] *ibid.,* II, 8.
[16] *ibid.,* II, 37.
[17] *ibid.,* II, 39.
[18] Green does not discuss this last—he probably had enough of it in the misunderstandings of Sir William Hamilton. He believed that what with Kant was the vital play of two opposing tendencies of thought, became in his english followers "a sort of ossification into a fallacious antithesis." *Works,* III, 127.
[19] *Works,* II, 11.

(act of conception), could not become an object which, on presentation of a like image, might be recognised as the same.[20]

The distinction between intuition and conception is possible only because Kant speaks of "object" in two senses: (1) as an object presented here and now, which is said to be "intuited"; (2) as an object connected, through the act of conception, with other objects in one system of experience. Green's criticism is that these two senses are not really distinguishable, because the "here" and "now" imply "connection with other objects in one system of experience." Kant separates the object as *individual*, from the object as *related*, forgetting that relations constitute individuality. All this is due to the fact that Kant accepts provisionally distinctions which it is the result of his work to invalidate.[21] The true distinction is not between relations constituted by thought and anything other than they, but between an isolated set of relations which we first learn to know and those with which the progressive communication of thought to us is gradually making us acquainted.[22] Or, in other words, it is a distinction between conception as determinant of particular feelings, and so constituting *perception*, and conceptions of laws of relation, as apart from the feelings which they determine.[23]

What Green is so laboriously insisting upon is that no independent reality can be ascribed to feeling, or that feeling can in no way be determined by something else than thought. The question is not whether a man can produce a "simple idea" by merely thinking, but whether there is such a thing as "mere thought" or "mere feeling." "We hold," he concludes, "that these phrases represent abstractions to which no reality corresponds, either in the facts of the world or in the consciousness to which those facts are relative." [24]

[20] *Works*, II, 21.
[21] *ibid.*, II, 22, 25.
[22] *ibid.*, II, 12.
[23] *ibid.*, II, 30.
[24] *Proleg.*, sect. 51. One of the shortcomings of Green's own philosophy, it has generally been admitted (*cp.* Haldar, "Green and his Critics," *Phil. Rev.*, III, 1896, pp. 168–175), was his failure to avoid these very difficulties he found in Kant. He was too much of a kantian to completely escape the dualism of feeling and thought, for knowledge was still to him the product of the presence of the self-conscious subject to the manifold of sense. His divergence from Kant lies in his refusal to make sense tell anything about itself. The real problem, as he understood it, is not the origin of sense, but how feelings become felt things, through the relating activity of the self. This very question sufficiently indicates his inability to escape the kantian dualism of the matter and form of knowledge. (Haldar, *op. cit.*, 171.)

This view of "phaenomenon" as something immediately given apart from its determination *mediately*, through conceived relations, leads inevitably to the idea of a "thing-in-itself." In the phenomenon a distinction has to be made between that which relates immediately to the object and that which does not. If the phenomenon be *this table*, and we remove from it the qualities given by conception, we are then left with the *this*, represented in the intuition. "It is the consciousness of something here and now affecting me. This in Kant's language relates immediately to the object." The question then is, what is this object? It can be regarded only as a necessary sequence of certain sensations on certain others—a relation constituted by the unity of understanding.[25] But Kant at times regards it as the "thing-in-itself," "'rendering nature possible on the material side,'" just as "unity of apperception" renders it possible "'on the formal side.'" The question is whether it is really more than the abstraction of the possibility of experience (of the synthesis implied in successive perceptions, and the syntheses of these syntheses), as distinct from its reality.[26]

One view in Kant of the "thing-in-itself" is that it is the "self" which renders possible experience as an experience of objects, but is not itself an object of which there can be experience. In the first edition of the *Critique* he was coming to regard this as the sole "thing-in-itself," but when he wrote the *Prolegomena* there was another "thing-in-itself" which makes nature possible in the material sense, as the cause of our sensations. The result is "an opposition between the source of our experience, *qua sensation*, and the source of it, *qua order* of sensations." [27]

Green objects to the one "thing-in-itself" quite as much as to the other; both being abstractions from the world of our experience.[28] The subject, for him, cannot exist apart from the object, any more than the object apart from the subject. Opposing the notion, however, that phenomena, as affections of sensibility, are due to the operation of unknown "things-in-themselves," Green grants that the unchangeable subject may be called a "thing-

[25] *Works*, II, 29.
[26] *ibid.*, II, 19n.
[27] *ibid.*, II, 28.
[28] *ibid.*, II, 30, *et passim.*

in-itself" in distinction from phenomena, because, though conditioned and realised in phenomena, it is not any one or all of them. "The true cause of any phaenomenon, on its material as well as on its formal side, as sensation no less than as conceived, lies in its relation to all phaenomena, in the system of nature, and this the unchangeable subject renders possible."[29] In this way, Green criticises and corrects Kant in the interest of a more consistent idealism, freed from the presuppositions inherited from the philosophy of empiricism.

2. The antithesis of sense and thought, of sensations and relations, is the basis of the doctrine that truths can be divided into such as are particular and contingent on the one side, and such as are universal and necessary on the other. Against this, Green maintains that only from relation to thought do feelings derive that character in virtue of which we oppose them to thought; that it is as impossible to divide knowledge into such elements "as to analyse the life of an animal into so much resulting from the action of the lungs, so much from the action of the heart." It is consequently equally impossible to divide judgments into *empirical* and *a priori*.

Again, the true point at issue is, what is experience? If it is merely succession of feelings, it yields no judgments at all, particular or universal. And if it be taken to mean "experience of objects"—which it must, if it is to yield singular propositions—there is no ground for this artificial and arbitrary division of truths into "contingent," derived from experience, and "necessary," not so derived,[30] Experience, then, constitutes universal judgments, because it is an experience of an object regarded as always remaining the same under the same conditions.

It is thus well enough for the modern logician to say (as against Kant) that experience can yield universal synthetical propositions, but he cannot at the same time retain Locke's view of the singular proposition as representing *merely* a sensible event or feeling. This distinction of empirical and *a priori* judgments fails to square with Kant's doctrine that the conception of experience as a whole of mutually determining parts is not of empirical origin. For a judgment determined by such a conception is not "empirical" in the sense of being a statement of an event or a multitude of events. If the meaning of "judgments of experience" is thus altered from its meaning to Locke, it is a question whether the antithesis between them and *a priori* judgments, or between synthetical and analytical, can be maintained in the form Kant put it.[31]

[29] *Works,* II, 30.
[30] *ibid.,* II, 5f.

3. The opposition of synthetical and analytical judgments is, like the above, a survival from the doctrine which opposes what the mind does for itself to facts about nature—a doctrine which it was the mission of Kant's philosophy to destroy, through its recognition that "'understanding prescribes laws *a priori* to phaenomena, and therefore to nature as a complex of all phaenomena.'"[32] "Synthetic judgments *a priori*" met Locke's difficulty over mathematics, for an originative function had to be allowed to mind in order to make mathematical propositions real and yet not trifling.[33] Thus they served their purpose, though a further analysis breaks down the oppositions implied in their name.

"All bodies are extended," is for Kant an analytical judgment. "All bodies are heavy," is a synthetical judgment. Green's point is to show that any attempt to interpret this distinction must end in doing away with it as a hard and fast antithesis.[34] If it means that "extension" is included in the meaning of the term, while "heaviness" is not, the only answer is that such inclusion is relative to the extent of the individual's knowledge.[35] In coming to know a man, for example, we may learn that he is phlegmatic, and this would be for us a process of synthesis. But after knowing him for a period of time, the proposition "he is phlegmatic" becomes purely analytical of the subject-conception, is part of what we understand by "he." In the same way, in two propositions such as, "All satellites shine by reflected light" and "All satellites revolve about a larger body," it could easily be claimed that both predicates are included in the meaning of the term. The fact is that to the educated man, both are so included; to the uneducated man neither is.

If the distinction is to mean that the first judgment, "All bodies are extended," representing a mere conception, involves no reference to experience, while the second does, the distinction also breaks down. For if "body" represents a mere conception in

[31] *Works,* II, 226.
[32] *ibid.,* II, 62.
[33] *ibid.,* II, 2f; I, 99.
[34] For a similar criticism of Kant's doctrine, *vide* Schiller, *Formal Logic,* p. 149f.
[35] *ibid.,* II, 6.

the first, it must do so likewise in the second, and the proposition must state the coexistence of such a conception with a succession of events in the way of feeling, which is nonsense. If we reduce "body" to a succession of feelings in (*b*), we must equally so reduce it in (*a*), for if it means body as experienced in the one, can it mean anything else in the other? Thus Kant's doctrine as to analytical judgments is knocked up.[36] He supposes that in judging body to be extended we do not go beyond the conception of body, while in judging it heavy we do go beyond the conception. But if we do not go beyond the conception, the judgment is otiose and does not represent real thinking at all. For "in all real thinking such a judgment would represent a process of going beyond a given subject to connect it with others. . . ." [37]

Kant got himself into a further difficulty in calling the principle of contradiction the test of the truth of an analytical judgment. For if it means the mental act in which we rehearse the contents of a definite conception, there is no meaning in calling the principle of contradiction the test of its truth, since it cannot be false. If the principle of contradiction is to be the test of its truth, it cannot be opposed to a synthetical judgment as that in which we do not "go beyond" a given conception.[38]

What is the true difference, then, between these two judgments? It is one of degree in the complexity of the synthesis which it involves or represents. In one case the subject is connected with a more, in the other with a less, complex result of intellectual synthesis.[39] As regards analysis and synthesis, the truth is that every judgment presupposes a synthesis which is an analysis of the complex, is itself an analysis, and an analysis which in all actual thinking is a step towards further synthesis.[40]

Both judgments are *synthetical,* in the sense that in them thought goes beyond the subject-conception, which would not be a conception if thought did not. For "conception = the thinking of an object under relations, and under relations which cannot be isolated and summed up, but of which each involves a farther relation." Both judgments are *analytical* in the sense that they imply "analysis of that mere consciousness of 'something there' with which our knowledge begins." Both relate equally to ex-

[36] *Works,* II, 6.
[37] *ibid.,* II, 227.
[38] *ibid.,* II, 60.
[39] *ibid.,* II, 227.
[40] *ibid.,* II, 230.

perience, the difference being simply that the correlative analysis and synthesis represented by the one is much more elementary than that represented by the other.[41] Though it is true, in short, that without extension we cannot think of body, in predicating extension of body we do go beyond the conception of "body" because the predicate expresses that very act of going beyond body without which body cannot be thought of.[42]

Green's doctrine of judgment, and his difference from Kant, thus stand out quite clearly. A consistent idealism cannot distinguish between *a posteriori* and *a priori* judgments, since it recognises in the beginning no distinction between intuition and conception, or that which is given and that which the mind adds of itself. Since nothing is given apart from thought, there is nothing to which thought can add something of its own, and the dichotomy falls. Likewise with synthetical and analytical judgments, no absolute distinction can be made, for synthesis and analysis are but two facets of every judgment. This is the beginning of that complete revolution in english logic, represented especially in the work of Bradley and Bosanquet, which was the result of the development of idealism away from Kant, and in which Green's work was largely instrumental.

4. The last of the inconsistencies in Kant which were carried over from the empirical tradition and which Green sought to overcome, is the distinction of space and time as forms of the outer and inner sense respectively. It results from Kant's failure to free himself from the old notion of the soul as inside the body, and of one sort of consciousness being produced through the body, another sort produced by the soul for itself. Accordingly, Kant calls the latter the "inner sense," the former the "outer." It is on this basis that Locke distinguished between "ideas of sensation" and "ideas of reflection." Green insists both that the distinction is untenable in itself and that it cannot be made to answer to the distinction between objects conditioned by the relation of space, and those conditioned by the relation of time.[43] Kant's trouble was that he never really gave up the notion that the sensuous or determinable is given to the understanding as a manifold in space and a manifold in time. "Though considering it

[41] *Works,* II, 62.
[42] *loc. cit.*
[43] *ibid.,* II, 252.

merely determin*able*, he yet assigns to it such actual determination as relation in space and relation in time constitute." [44]

This distinction between outer and inner sense cannot be explained either as a distinction between consciousness due to "external" and that due to "internal" stimulus, or as a distinction between "ideas of sensation" and "ideas of reflection"—in Hume's language, between "impressions" and "ideas." The first is impossible because the nervous stimulus cannot be distinguished into outer and inner, nor is it the object of consciousness. The second falls down because to any consciousness of an *outer* object, the second of these pairs is as necessary as the first.[45] The object of consciousness may be just as much outer when there is no sensation present as when there is.[46] Like so much else of the empirical account of knowledge, the distinction is derived not from an analysis of the experienced world, but from the supposed physiological conditions of experience.

But what could Kant properly mean by the distinction? As with the other distinctions that have been examined, Green does not pretend to discard it but to give it an interpretation in keeping with a consistent idealism. The true difference between outer and inner sense, he finds to lie "in the relation of the object as an object of consciousness, not in consciousness as apart from the object." It is a distinction between "the consciousness of objects as related to each other, not to the conscious subject, and the consciousness of objects as changes in the state of the conscious subject. Thus it is really a distinction not between two sorts of sense as such, but between two sorts of intellectual interpretation of sense, two functions of the understanding in the connection of phaenomena." [47] Again we find Kant criticised in the interests of an idealism that can tolerate no dualisms, such as those between mind and matter, thought and sense, conception and perception, inner and outer.

Kant, in opposing the notion that things qualified by relation are given independently of thought or the mind, the function of which is then to abstract these relations, the most universal of which is that of time, goes to the other extreme of assuming time to be first given by the mind as a "form" or relation, and that

[44] *Works*, II, 69.

[45] This point was especially insisted upon in his criticism of Spencer's doctrine of faint and vivid aggregates. (*vide infra*, p. 49.)

[46] *ibid.*, II, 65.

[47] *ibid.*, II, 65.

then objects are fitted into this form. The truth is, according to Green, that "time" is an abstraction from the related objects in which reality lies, but not an abstraction from "*a world* given independently of thought." [48]

iii

In conclusion, we will try to summarise those ideas which Green holds to be Kant's true contributions to philosophy, as representing those elements of Kant's system which he could fully accept and employ as the foundations of his own thought.

The most fruitful element in Kant's system is his view of the *noumenon* as ego—a view, which, as has been seen, Kant wavered in—as at once the source of the order of phenomena and of our knowledge of it, and as itself constituting an intelligible world of ends.[49] This makes the transcendental object and the transcendental subject the same; the order of nature and the unity of experience become two aspects of one and the same function of the eternal self.

Another important feature of the kantian philosophy is its doctrine that the conception of experience as a whole of mutually determining parts is not of empirical origin, but arises from the "unity of the self-conscious subject present to all intuitions." [50] This follows from the conception of experience not as a mere succession of perceptions, but as the determination of an object by means of perceptions. It implies a synthesis not contained in perception nor arising out of the nature of perception but a determination of perceptions *a priori* "by the necessity of being held together in one world with all other experience. . . ." [51] As Green showed in his criticism of Mill, this idea does away with the empirical logician's difficulty over making the principle which is to give validity to induction itself a product of inducton.

In the doctrine of the categories, Kant gave empiricism its death blow. It is obvious that if there are certain conceptions which are necessary to render objects of experience possible, these conceptions cannot be supposed to be derived from objects *a posteriori*, through abstraction and generalisation.[52] If there is any one notion that dominates all of Green's thought and criticism, it

[48] *Works*, II, 72.

[49] *ibid.*, III, 127.

[50] *ibid.*, II, 226.

[51] *ibid.*, II, 50.

[52] *ibid.*, II, 13.

is this. It is the unpardonable sin of Locke and Hume, Spencer, Lewes, and Mill, and all other philosophers who read conceptions into experience in order by a show of prestidigitation to derive them from it. Kant's doctrine avoids the eternal *petitio principii* involved in all such attempts.

Kant's deduction of the categories further explains how there come to be relations *objectively necessary,* in the sense that they are not relations by which we may or may not connect phenomena, because of our habits, or as the result of hereditary transmission, but because without them there could be no experience of objects at all.[53] This answers Locke's need of ascribing to external objects ideas which we have whether we will or no. Kant carries the idea farther by saying that "'there is always a transcendental condition at the foundation of necessity.'" If necessity is taken to mean merely the strongest possible condition of certainty, a psychological state, such an assumption is obviously needless. With Kant it means simply that which on ultimate analysis is found to be the condition of there being an object for us at all.[54] Connected with this idea, is the conception of "objects" as laws of relation between phenomena, constituted by the synthetic self-consciousness which "makes" nature. These relations presuppose something else just as much as they did for Locke, but it is not any substance or "thing-in-itself," but the eternal subject.[55]

Involved in this is Kant's identification of "ideas" and "relations of objects." This is especially noticeable in his doctrine of space and time, and seems absurd only to those whose notion of an idea is just that it is not a reality, and such is the notion that dominates empiricism. Space and time are the ideas which are the condition of mere feeling becoming a felt thing, but just for this reason, though *ideas,* they are relations of objects. And it is no refutation of Kant to assert that we have ideas of successive objects and of objects outside each other before we have the abstract ideas of space and time, for it simply represents a confusion of priority in time with the logical priority of those conditions without which there would be no experience at all.[56]

[53] *Works,* II, 33.
[54] *ibid.,* II, 26f.
[55] *ibid.,* II, 29.
[56] *ibid.,* II, 9.

III

EVOLUTION IN SUPPORT OF EMPIRICISM: SPENCER AND LEWES

i

Disappointed in the result of his *Introduction to Hume,* and finding that contemporary english philosophers resented his having called their systems anachronistic, Green turned his attention to his contemporaries themselves. The outcome was a series of articles entitled "Herbert Spencer and G. H. Lewes: Their Application of the Doctrine of Evolution to Thought," which appeared in the *Contemporary Review* between 1877 and 1881.[1] The thorough and relentless nature of his critical method, together with an occasional lapse into satire, provoked an acrid controversy which ended in his coming to believe that the irritation caused by controversial writing was an enemy to the cause of philosophic truth, and that the independent statement of opinion would lead to more profitable results.[2] Fortunately his criticism of Spencer and Lewes had been completed, and was to stand as a monument to the metaphysician's protest against empirical psychologists who do not understand the limits of their science.

It was Green's conviction that english empirical psychology "had got too far apart from, if not ahead of, the question which Hume (in effect) raised . . ." to be brought back to it by an inquiry into its antecedents. Each generation, he found, requires the questions of philosophy to be put to it in its own language, or it will not be at the pains to understand them. Thus he began a direct examination of that psychology itself, in order to produce the conviction that the primary question of metaphysics, "How is knowledge possible?" lay at its threshold and was finding nothing but a tautological or preposterous answer.[3]

The embarrassments and inconsistencies he found in the psychology of Spencer and Lewes were similar to those he had exposed in Locke and Hume, the chief difference being that they had

[1] *Works,* I, 373–520.
[2] *ibid.,* III, 148.
[3] *ibid.,* I, 373f.

become more skilfully concealed by a new and elaborate terminology. Metaphysical terms were masquerading in physical language, and were thus able to pass muster both as phenomena of consciousness and as physical conditions of consciousness.

ii

1. Green's first point of attack is upon the impossibility of psychology clearing itself of metaphysics, just as he insisted, in his lectures on Mill, that no logic can stand in isolation from its metaphysical foundations. Psychology cannot avoid being a theory of knowledge, nor can a theory of knowledge avoid being a theory of the thing known. It is a metaphysic still, and is so much the worse off if it does not know it.[4] Spencer and Mill defend themselves with a lay figure of the transcendentalist, by comparison with whose views, theirs appear as models of clarity and consistency. But this is a figure they have only set up to knock down, and no kantian or hegelian who knows what he is about owns the obscurantism they ascribe to him, for in the main it is not the truth of their doctrine he would challenge but its sufficiency.[5] The sin of the evolutionary psychologists is even greater than that of the early empiricists, for they not only use the methods of the earlier thinkers, methods which rendered knowledge impossible, but try to build on top of these a positive constructive philosophy, resting on the "certainty" of particular scientific facts and laws, and of the fundamental conceptions of science.[6]

But, it will be asked, what is this metaphysic that so conflicts with psychology? Green's answer is short. "It is simply the consideration of what is implied in the fact of our knowing or coming to know a world, or, conversely, in the fact of there being a world for us to know."[7] It is often supposed that metaphysic is concerned with the question, "Is knowledge possible?" It is no such superfluous labor, for why should anyone inquire whether he can do that which he is constantly doing, and must do in the very act of ascertaining whether he can do it? The primary question of metaphysics, then, is: "How is knowledge possible?" Such a question runs counter to the modern spirit. When the

[4] *Works*, I, 375.
[5] *cp. ibid.*, I, 376.
[6] *cp.* Dewey, "The Philosophy of T. H. Green," *Andover Review*, XI, p. 343.
[7] *Works*, I, 374.

need is for practice, not theory, for facts, not speculation, for science, not metaphysics (how these became divorced is another question); when man has got over the endless and futile disputes of the scholastics; why should a man give his time to such idle subjects? Green, satirically, gives no answer, but turns the question back on his opponents. "*Why* such a consideration should occupy the mind of man at all, is a question which comes strangely from a generation which has been taught by Positive Philosophy that the only reason why for anything is a sufficiently general and uniform *that*."[8] And, as Green caustically remarked, "It requires little subtlety to read metaphysics between the lines of the Positive Philosophy."[9]

The relation of psychology and metaphysics is further confused in Spencer and Lewes, representative philosophers of the day, by the implicit identification of them with empiricism and idealism respectively. It is the empiricists in England who represent the questions between them and the idealists, while the latter, because of theological bias or plain want of acumen, have failed to substitute the true differences for the supposed antitheses of the experimentalists. These were: (*a*) experience versus some unaccountable intuition as the source of knowledge, (*b*) testing of theories about nature by experimental verification versus testing by logical consistency.[10] Green wishes to show that "Both sides are in fact beating the air till they meet upon the question, What constitutes the experience which it is agreed is to us the sole conveyance of knowledge? What do we mean by a fact? In what lies the objectivity of the objective world?"[11] It is not that any philosopher disputes the fact that there is a real external world of which through feeling we have a determinate experience, but merely that the idealist asks for a further analysis of a fact which he finds far from simple. The empiricist of the nineteenth century stands just where Locke did two centuries earlier, for his doctrine, at bottom, is "we know because something makes us know." (Green leaves this to the logicians who are so fond of the story of opium and its *vis dormitiva*.) But this "something" is determined as a "world," as "real," and as "external," and as in some way reflecting itself in our experience.[12] And it

[8] *Works*, I, 374.
[9] *ibid.*, I, 375.
[10] *ibid.*, I, 385.
[11] *loc. cit.*
[12] *ibid.*, I, 377.

is the analysis of these further determinations that is the proper task of the metaphysician. "He is the inheritor of Plato's Dialectic, and has to give an account of the hypotheses which the sciences assume." [13]

2. In the philosophy of Spencer and Lewes, it is on the relation of subject and object, and its manifold ramifications, that Green's criticism largely fastens itself. Green's primary inquiry concerning Spencer is into the independence of the object as found in his psychology. Since, according to Spencer's own statement, a certain conception of the relation between subject and object is the presupposition of his system, Green takes as his text Spencer's account of these as "'antithetically opposed divisions of the entire assemblage of manifestations of the unknowable.'" [14] Having to regard all states of consciousness as related to "something else beyond them," and as deriving their nature from this relation, Spencer makes that something else the unknowable.[15] Thus the "unknowable" is strangely like Kant's "thing-in-itself." In fact, having no idea of what it can be, it might as well serve as God.[16] Like Locke's matter, its essence lies in the fact that nothing at all can be said about it.

Locke showed once and for all that the object of all philosophy, physical or metaphysical, is in some sort consciousness. An equivalent phrase, that "all knowledge is of phaenomena" is a commonplace of modern enlightenment.[17] Yet, as used, it is little more than a phrase, for these appearances are explained as molecular changes of a nervous organism, which neutralises the admission that they are appearances or that they are relative to consciousness at all. Once this step has been taken, Spencer's and Lewes' reduction of consciousness to physiological changes easily follows. "Beginning," as Green shows, "with a doctrine which, if it means anything, means that only as an element in a world of consciousness can any material relation be known, we are asked to explain consciousness itself as one sort of such material relation; which is as if a physiologist should explain the vital process by some particular motion of a muscle which it renders possible." [18]

3. As a relation between feelings can exist only for a combining consciousness, it is no less true that relations between feelings and motions or configurations of matter can exist only for a conscious subject.[19] Just as the term "phenomenon" cannot be used for both a representation and a supposed objective cause of the representation, so "feeling" cannot at once be a consciousness permanent throughout successive states and that of which the "objective side" is a nervous irritation, or transmission of force.[20] The primary question by which Lewes' doctrine is to be tried, is whether feelings, caused or constituted by neural tremors, can form such a consciousness of fact as can be the basis of intelligent experience. Green simply points out that in the analysis of any mode of consciousness we do not come upon neural tremors.[21] No irritations or affections of a sensitive organ enter into our conscious experience at all. The relations which these terms represent, in fact, are in an entirely different realm from "the mutual determination of ideas in the unity of consciousness." They imply distinctions of space and time: distinctions utterly foreign to the unity of consciousness. Being in heterogeneous and incompatible realms, they can in no way be regarded as two aspects of one and the same thing, nor can any causal relationship be established between them.[22] The question in its final form is: "Can that which, 'viewed on the physiological side, is the succession of neural tremors,' viewed on any other side be the unity of consciousness, and, apart from this unity, would 'our Cosmos,' the phenomenal world, be possible?" [23] Green insists that a *petitio principii* is involved in an explanation of consciousness by phenomena which only exist for it, because from these it cannot logically be derived. Green's argument is that of Schopenhauer against materialism, and he can be seized with a like fit of Olympian laughter in finding that knowledge, the laborious result of Lewes' system "was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very startingpoint. . . ." [24]

All this resort to physiological terms, this reduction of consciousness to neural tremors, is simply a strategem to reconcile the two conflicting ideas of empiricism: that of knowledge being

[13] *Works*, I, 377.
[14] *ibid.*, I, 385.
[15] *ibid.*, I, 431.
[16] *cp.* Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 128n.
[17] *Works*, I, 377.
[18] *ibid.*, I, 377f.
[19] *Works*, I, 379.
[20] *ibid.*, I, 435.
[21] *ibid.*, I, 476.
[22] *ibid.*, I, 476.
[23] *ibid.*, I, 445.
[24] Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Haldane and Kemp trans., I, 34.

of ideas or phenomena, with that of an external unknown something being the cause of ideas.

4. Before examining Spencer and Lewes on the relation of subject and object in particular, it would be well to follow Green's order, and consider the view of "a well instructed idealist of this century." To him, the generic element in the definition of the knowable universe is that it is a relation between subject and object, to neither of which correlata he allows any reality apart from the other. For "every determination of the one implies a corresponding determination of the other." [25] As a misunderstanding of this doctrine is responsible for Spencer's independent matter and mind, and for the psychogenesis of both him and Lewes, it will be necessary to examine in detail their views on the subject-object relation.

Spencer represents a doctrine, which, wisely taking the relation between subject and object as its datum, then proceeds to interpret this into a "dictum" on the part of consciousness that something independent of itself is acting upon it. With this start, it can easily explain knowledge of the world as the result of the action of one member of the relation upon the other. In short, "Instead of regarding subject and object as logical or ideal (though not the less real) factors of a world which thought constitutes, it 'segregates' them as opposite divisions of the world, as two parts of the complex of phaenomena, separate though capable of mutual interaction, of which one is summarily described as thoughts, the other as things." [26] What they are doing, without knowing it, is to admit the determination of subject by object, while ignoring the converse. It is equivalent to saying that all knowledge is of phenomena and then to explain knowledge as produced by phenomena. But as Green suggests, their confusion arises from that metaphysical ineptitude which leads them to think of the subject-object relation in physical terms, as if it were a matter of inner and outer, or externality in space, not realising that these relations again, exist only as objects for a subject. Thus identifying the object with a real world beyond consciousness, Spencer offers a realism "scarcely distinguishable from the crude idealism of Locke." [27]

Spencer alleges the reality of this something out of consciousness on the grounds that he has to think it. It is pronounced "real" because of this obligation. But it is clear that "something we are obliged to think" is something we do think, and therefore is not "out of consciousness." Or if, as Green further complicates the paradox, "its 'reality' is 'out of consciousness,' we have something determined solely as being that which its reality is determined solely as not being. Of the 'something' we can only say that it is found in consciousness; of its 'reality' we can only say that it is 'out of consciousness.'" [28] Further, this "something out of consciousness," Spencer breaks into an "'indefinable consciousness,'" on the one hand, and "'a mode of being beyond consciousness, for which it stands,'" on the other. "The result, then," Green finds, "is that the 'object,' about which Mr. Spencer undertakes to set the idealists right, is according to him, something of which we can only say that it is consciousness, 'standing for' something of which we can only say that it is not consciousness." [29] This doctrine will be recognised as merely a repetition of Locke's "simple feeling" taken to represent the real. Like other members of his school, Spencer fails to see that in that consciousness which reveals a world, the object is given not as "beyond" but as immanent; not as an unknown opposite, but as a determinant; not as independent of the subject, but as a correlative of it.[30]

Spencer's method of finding the subject and object of knowledge, differs not a whit from that of Locke, and ends in the same inevitable dualism of mind and matter. He divides the totality of his consciousness into a faint aggregate, which he calls his mind, a special part of the vivid aggregate cohering with the faint, which he calls his body, and the remainder of the vivid aggregate. With the stage thus arranged he can easily account for knowledge by having one part of the vivid aggregate work changes through the other part, called his body, in the faint, and have the faint, in the same way, work changes in the vivid.[31] Though it appears here that the object is in consciousness, being half of the totality of consciousness, opposed to the other half, the subject, it will be seen that Spencer identifies this distinction with that between body and mind.[32] The distinctions which he points out between

[25] *Works*, I, 386.
[26] *ibid.*, I, 388.
[27] *ibid.*, I, 389.
[28] *Works*, I, 390.
[29] *ibid.*, I, 391.
[30] *ibid.*, I, 399f.
[31] *ibid.*, I, 391.
[32] *ibid.*, I, 392.

the states called "vivid" and those called "faint" are almost those by which Berkeley, following Locke, distinguished "ideas of sense" from "ideas of imagination," and Hume "impressions" from "ideas."[33] Spencer's difficulty is that one kind of experience, consisting of successive states of feeling, distinguished as more or less vivid, gives us the distinction between subject and object, while quite another experience gives us a consciousness of resistance and some force which the resistance measures. And although he puts one experience for another indifferently, the difference between them is just that between an experience which does and one which does not reveal a world.[34]

All of Spencer's travail over the object arises from his regarding all states of consciousness as related to "'something else beyond them,'" and as deriving their nature from this relation. His dissension from the idealist lies in his answer to the question: what is this something else? He has three conceptions which logically exclude each other. First, he regards it as the unknowable. On second thought he makes it matter as including force, or force as that of which matter and motion are manifestations. But this, as the determinant of all phenomena, is "objective" and implies antithesis of a coördinate subject. Hence his third conception of it breaks it into two—"a subjective something else, and an objective something else, a mind and a matter."[35] Through all of these it is clear that a dualism of "things beyond consciousness" is presupposed by that division of consciousness into antithetical and independent halves which is supposed to give the distinction between subject and object, but which in reality is derived from it. And he can maintain his doctrine only by regarding the subject as one thing beyond consciousness and the object as another; each producing certain modes of it.[36]

Turning to Lewes from Spencer, it would seem at first that he, in his recognition of the correlativity and mutual dependence of subject and object, escapes Spencer's inconsistencies. But the same theory of the physical derivation of consciousness renders this impossible, since he is obliged to suppose the existence of an object "'which is not the other side of the subject, but the larger circle which includes it.'" It is at once patent that this is an object which is objective to nothing. And as none of the predicates representing relations of the world we know are applicable to it, it is equivalent to Spencer's mysterious unknowable. Like Spencer, further, Lewes tries to deduce the "world which is objective in the intelligible sense from that which is so in no intelligible sense at all, under terms only applicable to the former."[37]

[33] *Works*, I, 393.
[34] *ibid.*, I, 399.
[35] *ibid.*, I, 431.
[36] *ibid.*, I, 432.

Thus it is evident that these men, while appearing to regard favorably the idealist recognition that all knowledge and all intelligible reality involves the relation of subject and object, fear the consequences which they surmise it must lead to if carried out consistently. Accordingly, they nullify their own admission by conceiving the relation in physical terms or by destroying its correlativity. They are willing to follow ideas only so far as ideas lead them in the way they are determined to go.

5. We have seen how Spencer tries to get the subject and object of knowledge out of the distinction between faint and vivid aggregates of consciousness; the vivid aggregate being independent of the faint, and thus giving the independence of matter, or the object.[38] It is precisely the old empirical endeavor to distinguish sensation and perception, and then make sensation (independent of the mind's activity) give a real world of objects. Spencer wishes to hold the "vivid aggregate" as independent, but he has to ascribe to it two characteristics essential to its being what he takes it to be, each of which is incompatible with its independence. First, every vivid feeling of the experience he ascribes to the vivid aggregate is determined by connection with modes of consciousness which fall to the "faint aggregate." Secondly, the whole experience is dependent on something which is neither one of the conscious states forming the aggregate, nor all of them together, but is permanent throughout the succession.[39] The fact is that only by a misuse of terms is this vivid aggregate called an aggregate at all. For "the 'states of consciousness' which form it 'have none of them any permanence.' Each 'changes from instant to instant.'" This being the nature of them, Green insists that "to speak of such states 'aggregating' or 'segregating themselves' is a contradiction in terms."[40]

Furthermore, it is obvious that the "totality of consciousness"

[37] *Works*, I, 446.
[38] *ibid.*, I, 401.
[39] *ibid.*, I, 402.
[40] *ibid.*, I, 393; I, 408.

does not admit of being divided into antithetical halves on the basis of a distinction which is one of degree. The distinction, in fact, is only derived from that which is supposed to be derived from it. Having already divided our experiences into those which belong to the mind and those which are the product of outward things, we may then find one relatively faint and the other relatively vivid, but then to attempt to derive the former distinction from the latter is a *petitio principii* of the first order. If we had not the first antithetical division in our minds, there would be nothing to suggest it in the constant transition from more to less lively feeling and vice versa.[41] Spencer himself could not surmount this difficulty, for he assigned experiences to the different aggregates on grounds other than those of degree of vivacity.[42]

From his criticism of Locke and Hume it may easily be divined what direction Green will take. His chief point of attack rests on his denial that the vivid aggregates could be anything without the faint ones. Like all empiricists, and even Kant at times, Spencer ignores the fact that objects are not given directly in sensation, in "vivid states" without intellectual interpretation, or faint ones. The vivid states can form objects only when qualified by faint ones, and if these objects are to be reckoned clusters of states of consciousness, "they are clusters into which faint states enter as qualifying the vivid, and into which the vivid states enter only as so qualified." [43] Spencer cannot at once regard sensations as elements in the "clusters" which we call sensible things or real objects, and as independent of the faint states. "If," as Green insists, "the 'vivid aggregate' is to be identified with the objective world, we must say that only qualification by the 'faint aggregate' or subject renders it such a world at all." [44] It will be recognised as the old empirical error of reading into sensations the work of the mind and then making sensations, as thus qualified, stand for a real world outside of consciousness, because with its determination the mind has had nothing to do. To take a particular instance, Spencer makes the succession of feelings give the perception of antecedence or consequence, that which they cannot do unless they are taken up into one conception and thus cease to be feelings at all. Or as Green remarks frequently in treating of

[41] *Works,* I, 402.
[42] *ibid.,* I, 403.
[43] *ibid.,* I, 405.
[44] *ibid.,* I, 405f.

Hume, the idea of succession cannot be derived from sensations of which one is past before another begins.[45]

But Green carries his criticism still further. Not only does he deny that the objective world is given in the "vivid aggregate," but he denies that Spencer's vivid aggregate enters into the objective world at all. For is sensation, as such, an element in perception? It is not, he argues, for a sensation cannot "become one of the related elements of which in every perception there is a consciousness." [46] Perception is of facts and a perceived object is resoluble into certain facts, and facts consist of relations. Thus sensation, *qua* sensation, cannot enter into such a relation as one of its constituents, but only the fact that a sensation is felt. The designation "vivid," accordingly, is inappropriate to such a fact. Green's conclusion is that although, of course, perception presupposes feeling, "the feeling only survives in perception as transformed by consciousness, other than feeling, into a fact which remains for that consciousness when the feeling has passed." [47]

It is to be noted that Spencer himself admits this distinction when he rightly insists on the difference between "'having a sensation and being conscious of having a sensation.'" All that is required from him, then, is the recognition that only the latter is a constituent of the real objective world, and that such terms as faint and vivid are altogether inapplicable to it.[48] Though it may seem paradoxical to insist that sensations do not enter into our perceptions of objects, the persuasion that they do so enter, that sensation is a constituent of perception, results from our having to express sensations in words already assigned to the perception of sensible objects. We have need of words, in short, only because we think in feeling, and when we come to reflect on our mental processes we have no other words for the feelings than those we have applied to the perceptions.[49] Thus we are constantly led to overlook the essential difference between "the phenomenon," the proper object of perception, and the sensation which precedes that process or any of the sensations which accompany it.[50] Again the conclusion is forced upon us that the distinction between faintness and vividness does not apply at all to

[45] *Works,* I, 408.
[46] *ibid.,* I, 411.
[47] *ibid.,* I, 411f.
[48] *ibid.,* I, 413.
[49] *ibid.,* I, 414.
[50] *ibid.,* I, 415.

the sensible objects and relations of the world.[51] For, apart from the other objections, no such separation or relation of mutually independent elements, such as that "between an aggregate of perceivable facts and an aggregate of objects represented in memory or imagination," is possible as Spencer "supposes to exist between the aggregates called vivid and faint, which he identifies severally with subject and object."[52] Permeating all this confusion of Spencer, and empiricists generally, is the failure to understand that there is no perception without conception, but that there may be conception without perception. If he is to make any kind of order out of his vivid states, Spencer has to read into the feelings which comprise them, certain relations which are regarded as perceived, but as still independent of the faint states. The truth is that the phenomena Spencer calls "'members of the vivid series'" always belong to the order of nature, the realm of cause and effect, but they only so belong because they are not what he says they are.[53]

6. This discussion of the subject and object in knowledge, which, because he conceived it in physical terms, did not mean to Spencer what it does to the idealist, leads to his doctrine of matter and mind, or of the world and thought. Green holds that the prevalent confusion over matter and mind, by which matter is regarded as a real something external to mind, goes back to Berkeley. Fastening upon the supposed externality of the real something of Locke, Berkeley asked the wrong question about it. For "the true question is not whether there is such a thing as external matter, but what it is external to; whether its outwardness is an outwardness *to* thought, or an outwardness of body to body only possible for *thought*."[54] This is the reef on which so many modern philosophies have floundered that the mere avoidance of it already places one among the select. It is this shoddy thinking that was for Green the unpardonable anachronism of his contemporaries. If Berkeley asked the wrong question about external bodies he at least saw that some question had to be asked, and was too much of a philosopher not to seek escape from Locke's inconsistencies. How the relation of subject and object could possibly be identified with that between mind and matter,

[51] *Works,* I, 416.
[52] *ibid.,* I, 422.
[53] *ibid.,* I, 428.
[54] *ibid.,* I, 380.

or thought and outward things, appears well nigh inexplicable if we but realise that "That to which anything is outside must be in space—must itself be outside that which is outside it." And though we can speak glibly of things being outside the mind, we recognise at once the nonsense of talking of mind as outside things.[55] But it must always be the error of him who like Locke confuses metaphysical terms with physical imagery and carries his mind about with him in a coach. However, if he cannot avoid this confusion of tongues, it would be far wiser for him to speak of carrying a coach about with him in his mind.

But not to digress too far, the correct doctrine, and one which cannot be refuted by Dr. Johnson's simple expedient, is "that all externality is a relation of matter to matter, with which the relation between thought and its object can only be identified by a misleading metaphor, since thought alone furnishes the synthesis in virtue of which any relation of externality can exist."[56] Since, as was pointed out above, every object of knowledge is determined by the subject-object relation, the reality of matter is just as little merely objective as merely subjective. It is precisely the same with the reality of mind, if we mean by it "'the connected phenomena of conscious life.'" For just as "'Matter,' in being known, becomes a relation between subject and object; 'mind,' in being known, becomes so equally."[57]

On the basis of these principles it is at once clear that Spencer and Lewes are grossly in error in speaking of the relation between matter and mind, as if it were the same as that between subject and object. Each member of the former relation is constituted by a mode of the latter. Nor is it to the purpose to exempt matter *in itself* from this relation, for when we are identifying the relation between matter and mind with that between subject and object, it is not matter in itself that is in question, but matter as *phenomenon,* matter as known.[58]

This criticism brings us but to the threshold of Spencer's system, for he has now to establish the object as independent of the subject, matter as independent of thought. His whole attempt to do this rests on his derivation of the so-called *a priori* ideas, through evolution, from the experience of the organism in con-

[55] *Works,* II, 200.
[56] *ibid.,* I, 380.
[57] *ibid.,* I, 387.
[58] *loc. cit.*

tact with an objective world. Or as Lewes succinctly puts it, "'by showing that constant experiences of the race become organised tendencies which are transmitted as a heritage, Mr. Spencer shows that such *a priori* forms as those of space, time, causality, etc. which must have arisen in experience because of the constancy and universality of the external relations, are necessarily connate.'" [59] Green's reply is that it is a questionable achievement to have discovered that, "given space, time, and causality, as constant and universal external relations, together with an experience of them, they become necessarily connate forms of experience." In short, it is hard to see how the result differs from that from which it is derived, or if it does differ, what merit there can be in having discovered the derivation.[60] The empiricist resembles the popular magician in such performances as this, for having put the rabbit into the hat he can mystify his audience by pulling it out. And like the audience of the magician, the readers of the empiricist ask the wrong question; the problem is not, how he got the rabbit out, but how he put it into the hat in the first place. The only difference, perhaps, is that the magician does not fool himself.

Spencer refutes Hume by the same sort of prestidigitation. He takes his refutation of Hume's denial of real unity to mind and matter as a proof that there is a real world "beyond consciousness." What it really proves is that consciousness is not what he takes it to be, "for it cannot at once be what Mr. Spencer's system requires it to be, and tell what his system requires it to tell." The trouble with Spencer is that "consciousness" has two different meanings, and his system is only possible by an equivocation between them. By making consciousness a mere succession of

[59] *Works*, I, 383. In the same way, Green finds the evolutionists claiming to give a whole new character to ethical inquiries. For whereas in Hume's time the naturalistic moral philosopher had only the limits of the individual life to trace the history of the moral sentiments whose innateness he denied, the spencerian theorist, by means of the doctrine of hereditary transmission, can give a much more plausible derivation of human interests from animal wants. He is able to explain "how the susceptibilities of pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion, of hope and fear, may be handed down with gradually accumulated modifications which in time attain the full measure of the difference between the moral man and the greater ape." (*Proleg.*, sect. 5.) Though we shall not take up Green's refutation of this doctrine, his method will appear from his criticism of the spencerian derivation of the *categories*.

[60] *loc. cit.*

states, it is easy to show that the objective world is independent of it. But it cannot be such a succession if it is to tell of an objective world at all.[61] This is the now familiar confusion between the psychological and logical that runs through all empiricism. As Bosanquet has so well pointed out, our consciousness can be looked at either as a stream of ideas and feelings, taking place in our several heads, or in the way in which it presents a systematic, organised picture of inter-acting objects.[62] Spencer and Lewes, taking consciousness in the former sense, naturally make the objective world, *i.e.*, consciousness in the latter sense, independent of it. They ignore the fact that they are examining merely two different aspects of consciousness, not consciousness and something outside of consciousness, independent of it. In other words, Spencer, finding in consciousness something which is not *states of* consciousness, abstracts it, and ignoring its dependence on consciousness, makes it yield the conception of matter.[63]

Lewes does not escape this ambiguity—the ambiguity of all empirical psychology. "He does not distinguish," Green finds, "between feeling and felt thing, between sensation and sensible fact; or, more particularly, between feeling as it 'arises in the sensible excitation of the organism by something acting upon it'—in a moment arises and passes away—and the fact that such a feeling has so arisen, a fact which does not pass with the feeling but remains as a permanent constituent in a world of intelligible objects." [64] Furthermore, reducing the fact and its relations to feelings, and accounting for feeling as an excitation produced from without, he seems to account for the world of experience as the result of such excitations.

Probably the fundamental fault Green found with the psychologists of his day was their neglect of the problem of perception. The real problem of a philosophy of knowledge lies in the synthesis that goes to constitute the perceived object, "and it is just this which our psychologists so seldom condescend to notice." "Account for perception," he says, "and conception will take care of itself." [65] The worst of the matter is that on these equivocations and inconsistencies as a foundation, Spencer and Lewes seek

[61] *Works*, I, 398f; *cp. supra*, p. 77.
[62] *Essentials of Logic*, p. 16.
[63] *Works*, I, 430.
[64] *ibid.*, I, 444.
[65] *ibid.*, I, 444f.

to trace the evolution of the knowing subject. To Green this is the most unforgivable of all sophistries. Empirical psychology is inadequate enough as an explanation of knowledge, but when, overlooking the conclusions which Hume showed logically follow from it, it attempts to become a positive constructive *psychogeny,* it sins beyond all hope of redemption.

7. In reply to Hodgson, who had attacked his criticism of Spencer,[66] Green reaffirmed his basic thesis. He is simply calling into question " Spencer's whole theory of the origin of intelligent consciousness as arising ultimately from the operation of the object, unknown in itself, upon a subject to which it stands in this relation of independence and externality." [67] We have already considered the difficulties represented by the terms *unknown, independent,* and *externality,* with regard to the object member of the subject-object relation. By such equivocations, Green wishes to show, Spencer's *psychogenesis* is largely an affair of nomenclature. He assumes as materials certain elementary feelings, which are nothing apart from their determination in a system of consciousness, and then traces a genesis out of them of the system they presuppose. Having found one set of terms for the materials, fictitiously abstracted, another for the concrete result, he takes credit for a discovery in the natural history of mind.[68]

Spencer's machinery, by which he obtains this independent object, and generates mind out of it, is to be found in his doctrine of a *non-ego* as force which is an immediate and primitive deliverance of consciousness. It must be found in simple sensation or in an organisation of sensation with which the mind has nothing to do, or it would be an " ideal construction " and the independence of the object could no longer be maintained. It is clear that feeling has to be incompatible things—both a passing state caused through nervous *excitation* by the exercise of force, and the consciousness of relation between such states as so caused—if it is to yield immediate evidence, independent of " ideal constructions," of the non-ego as exercising force.[69] The difficulty, in short, lies in explaining the experience of matter and force as resulting from the action of matter and force.[70] Spencer succeeds in doing this

[66] " Professor Green as a Critic," *Contemporary Review,* Dec., 1880.
[67] *Works,* I, 522.
[68] *ibid.,* I, 439.
[69] *ibid.,* I, 435.
[70] *ibid.,* I, 442.

by looking " into his breast " like Locke, and finding the experience of resistance (Locke's solidity), which at once reports to him the existence of a resistant something, independent of consciousness.[71] Just as in Locke, this is possible only by reading into this experience the idea of cause, which is not to be found there if the experience is what Spencer tries to make it.

Lewes, though seeming to recognise the correlativity and mutual dependence of subject and object, destroys his own apparent doctrine by trying to derive consciousness, hitherto nonexistent, from an object which, unlike all other objects, has no subject. His theory that our world arises in consciousness, and that an object implies a subject, would lead him into *idealism,* did he not avert it by his treatment of sentience as being neural excitation on one hand and the consciousness called " ' feeling the world ' " on the other. By this device, he is enabled to hold that our world does arise in consciousness, and at the same time to make it a product of forces which have not so arisen.[72] This doctrine has already been briefly criticised. Green's essential objection is that only the unity of consciousness itself, having rendered possible the synthesis of one sort of phenomena as a succession of neural tremors, and that of another sort as the " ' differentiation of feeling,' " can combine both syntheses as " ' two sides ' " of one and the same reality. Even if the unity of consciousness be the *other side* of the succession of tremors, it is not its product, " but the *prius* or presupposition of their existence, as an existence for us." [73]

There is then an essential discrepancy between Lewes' psychology and his *psychogeny*—" between his doctrine of the world as arising in consciousness on the one hand, and his physiological derivation of consciousness with its world from something independent of it on the other." [74] This rests on the prevailing refusal of empiricism to recognise the distinction between experience as a sequence of psychical events, and the experience of objects in an ordered system of the world. These objects, and the system of relations which both constitute them as objects and make them part of a system of knowledge, are not events in the way of feeling, and are only possible on the assumption of a unit other than the events and not passing with them, through relation

[71] *Works,* I, 395.
[72] *ibid.,* I, 484.
[73] *ibid.,* I, 445.
[74] *ibid.,* I, 447.

to which they are related to each other.[75] Yet Lewes will try to evolve this subject, for which the world of experience arises, from the succession of psychical events.

Such talk of evolution is idle. It is the use of the "charm of a potent word to hide a confusion of thought." [76] For evolution always implies an identity in difference, a continuance of the material in the evolved product, while between the unity of consciousness and the sequence of feelings, between the development through repeated sensation of the structure organic to sense and the development of consciousness in experience of facts, there is no common element. The former process does not continue itself into the latter. Again the genetic method has failed. Lewes has to presuppose that which is evolved in order to establish the objective reality of the material or process out of which it is evolved.[77]

Since Darwin, empiricists have thought that they could settle the question as to the relation between the feeling and thinking consciousness by a comparison of man with the "lower animals." Green maintains, on the other hand, that neither a discovery as to the probable evolution of the human from the animal structure, nor of the apparent approximation of brutes to our intelligence, can have any bearing on the question. It must be settled first, before any such discovery can be correctly interpreted. For "Before we can decide on the relation of a higher to a lower organism, we must know what the higher organism is, and to know this we must know its function." [78] Its function, we know from other passages in Green, is to be found only by an examination of the world of knowledge and the moral world, which it renders possible.

The solution to Lewes' difficulty might be sought, Green suggests, in substituting for the process by which "'the cosmos arises in consciousness,'" a process through which "the consciousness for which the cosmos eternally exists becomes partially ours." [79] Whether Green's *Absolute,* the "eternal self-consciousness," satisfactorily answers all the difficulties he finds in the theories of Spencer and Lewes cannot be considered here. It is sufficient to point out what these difficulties were, how they arose, and how they invalidate any system which has not made an altogether fresh start.

[75] *Works,* I, 443.
[76] *ibid.,* I, 467.
[77] *ibid.,* I, 467.
[78] *ibid.,* I, 474.
[79] *ibid.,* I, 483.

8. After this criticism of the basic doctrines of the evolutionary empiricists, it is hardly to be expected that Green should find them holding an adequate theory of reality. With regard to this, as we have seen, the earlier empiricists left many loop-holes for Green's attack. Underlying all of Locke's doctrine was the contradiction between a conception of the real which alone allows it to be knowable, but finding it in relations, implies that it is the work of thought, and a conception which leaves it the unknown negative of consciousness. On the basis of this latter conception is feeling taken to be the organ which reports the real, but it is left with nothing real to report. Current philosophy, Green insists, if it is to be proof against the charge of being anachronistic, must show that it has overcome this essential contradiction.[80] Hume, carrying out this idea consistently, could recognise no order of nature other than the varying regularity with which one idea suggests another. The modern "experientalists," attempting to reconcile Hume with the procedure of the physical sciences, save themselves by assuming both the reality of an objective order, and an elementary consciousness of it, as antecedents of the knowledge process. They are merely ignoring the question Hume tried to meet. "Given a world of intelligible relations, it is easy to account for knowledge." [81] Hume tried to explain such a world away in order to maintain consistently the theory that identifies it with feeling. But his pretended successors take for granted the reality of such a world along with a theory of reality which excludes it.[82]

Spencer found the *objectivity* (*i.e.,* with him, reality) of the objective world in its dependence on some matter or force, to which our consciousness testifies as its effect. Lewes carries out the same method. With his propositions that "'the real is what is given in feeling,'" that the sole content of experience is feeling, and that feeling is a necessary consequence of "'the process of neural grouping,'" it is easy to deduce the objective world which arises in our experience from an object which is a larger circle that includes the subject.[83] It is impossible to get any consistent theory of reality out of this confusion. Green finds, in fact, three conflicting views of reality in Lewes. According to the first, the real is the external as such; according to the second, the real is feeling, as such: "the immediate *datum* of consciousness about

[80] *Works,* I, 379.
[81] *ibid.,* I, 382.
[82] *ibid.,* I, 382f.
[83] *ibid.,* I, 455f.

which we cannot be mistaken"; while according to the third, the real is "a system of uniform and permanent relations," for it is these which constitute the reality of feeling.[84] As in Locke, the presentation is real because it is the direct result of something external which is real in its own right. Immediately arises the old question which bothered Locke so greatly, and the recognition of which made Berkeley's idealism possible: how is sensation to be like the real? Lewes saw the difficulty, but having to make sensation give reality, asserted that "'Existing for us only in feeling, its reality is what we feel.'" Thus sensation can be like the real only by shifting the real, from something external, to feeling.[85] But when it is said that, "'the object existing for us only in feeling, its reality is what we feel,'" any question of the relation between feeling and the real object is set aside by making this real object the feeling itself.

Green feels that the circle this theory has described is patent. Feeling represented the real because feeling was a nervous excitation, which was a product of external factors of sensation, ether vibrations, etc. From that, we have come to feeling as giving the real, which necessarily destroys completely the reality of anything so unlike feeling as nervous excitations, ether vibrations, and the other external factors of sensation, as well as force, matter, and the like abstractions.[86] What Lewes has in mind throughout this account, however, appears not to be feeling as felt but feeling as determined by relations which are not events in the way of feeling at all. For "Behind the judgment conveyed by the words, 'the object exists for us only in feeling,' there always lies the other judgment, 'feeling is the mode in which an object exists for us.'" An object cannot exist in feeling, if words mean anything at all.[87] To the idealist, at any rate, an object can be given only in judgment, as involving the conception of relations, and thus in thought.[88] Lewes, through these equivocations, is brought to a third implicit conception of reality as the relation of certain factors which condition feeling.[89]

Lewes' contradiction with himself lies in the view of reality as external with one which logically does away with it. When we

[84] *Works,* I, 491.
[85] *ibid.,* I, 492.
[86] *ibid.,* I, 493.
[87] *ibid.,* I, 494.
[88] *ibid.,* I, 519.
[89] *ibid.,* I, 494.

have resolved the reality of things into relations we have superseded the notion that real things are things in space or external. When we have admitted that the external-internal relation is necessary to constitute an object of sense, we have logically discarded the notion of this relation as one between the object and consciousness, that nemesis of all commonsense philosophy.[90] Likewise, a real world apart from consciousness has disappeared, for relations exist only for a conscious subject. "A world," as Green develops the implications of this doctrine, "which is a system of relations implies a unit, self-distinguished from all the things related, yet determining all as the equal presence through relation to which they are related to each other; and such a unit is a conscious subject."

iii

If anything is basic in this criticism of psychological empiricism, it is the idea that fundamental for a philosophy is a sound theory of consciousness, and that this cannot rest on physiology, which has no more connection with it than has chemistry or mechanics. Just as Aristotle criticised his predecessors for having cut off parts of being in their special sciences, and having substituted them for being as being, so does Green refuse to allow a physiological explanation of consciousness or mind. How then, it may be asked, is a true theory of consciousness to be got? It must rest, he insists, on an examination of objects, as "made by it, as exhibiting in their constitutive relations the work of the consciousness in and through which alone they are related."[91] If we wish to know the nature of mind, the one approach is to analyse those fundamental relations involved in all knowing—to study the world of our experience as our consciousness presents it to us. It is the familiar method of Plato and Aristotle which finds the nature of a thing in its function, and holds the function of mind to be the presentation of an intelligible order. The most cogent criticism of Green that can be made is that he himself deviated from strict adherence to this method. Too often he examined the world of knowledge in terms of supposed faculties of mind and processes of the understanding, derived from Kant, instead of confining himself to the development of a theory of mind solely out of the analysis of conscious experience.

[90] *Works,* I, 499.
[91] *ibid.,* I, 483.

IV

THE LOGIC OF EMPIRICISM: JOHN STUART MILL

i

During the two years following the publication of his *Introduction to Hume,* and before undertaking the criticism of Spencer and Lewes, Green prepared and gave at Oxford two sets of critical lectures on logic.[1] Free from the necessity of meeting psychologists on their own ground, as he was in the later work, and able to devote the major portion of his attention to logic and metaphysic themselves, these lectures represent, in many ways, the culmination of his critical activities. Much that is new appears in them, and Green's position is often made more explicit in correspondence with the more complete formulation of empirical logical doctrine in J. S. Mill.

1. Green found current two opposed views of the office of logic; that of the formal logicians with whom logic is the science of those "forms of thought" in conforming to which we think correctly, and that of the others for whom logic is the science of the method of knowledge.[2] Of the former, he took Hamilton and Mansel as specimens, of the latter, Mill, and through them exhaustively criticised both schools. Significantly, his criticism probes, with numerous variations, what he conceived to be the same two basic errors in both types of logical theory. His positive contribution is the substitution of a logic of internal relations for the classic logic of external relations, exemplified equally by both these schools.

His lectures on formal logic, which may be examined briefly as an introduction to his criticism of Mill, are devoted to an attempt to prove: (*a*) that the opposition between intuition and thought, as between presentation and representation, is fallacious; and incidentally, (*b*) that it is fallacious to suppose that it is the

[1] *Works,* II, 158–306.

[2] *ibid.,* II, 158–160. It is interesting to note that Prof. Dewey, in his *Essays in Experimental Logic,* pp. 217ff, criticises both of these theories in much the same way Green did, but from a vantage point which allows him to criticise Green's *transcendental* position as well.

function of thought, having found things with attributes—given independent of thought—to abstract these.[3]

2. The formal logicians oppose presentation and representation as if thought had nothing to do with the former. Individual things are supposed to be *found* with attributes, as if the attributes were there and observed apart from the action of thought.[4] Just as, with Locke, the conjectural real object disappears when it is asked how much of it is reducible to actual present sensation, "so it is when we ask how much of an object of intuition remains after abstraction of all that belongs to it as representative." "This Book" is an object of intuition, but the qualities or relations which make it a book are not now presented in intuition at all, and thus the knowledge is not presentative but representative. Otherwise there is just the "this," "that," "here" or "now," and even these imply relations not presented.[5] There is thus no intuition without conception, no presentation without representation.[6]

3. The object being given independent of thought, the second notion, that it is the office of thought to abstract the presented attributes, inevitably follows. It has its root in the conversion of the antithesis between mere feeling and thought into the antithesis between the sensible thing and the work of thought,[7] which was found to run through the writings of Locke and Hume. It is patently false to suppose that mere abstraction of attributes really constitutes any intellectual process whatever.[8] And further, Green is confident that the antithesis between the work of thought and reality, which has governed english philosophy, is ascribable to this notion of thought as abstraction. For "If the function of thought is abstraction, the highest ideas (as that on which the function of thought has been most exercised) will have least reality: in short, the more we think, the less we know."[9] If this process of abstraction really took place, it would consist in moving backwards. "It would be a donkey race. The man who had gone least way in it would have the advantage, in respect of fulness and definiteness of thinking, of the man who had gone

[3] *Works,* II, 192.
[4] *ibid.,* II, 168.
[5] *ibid.,* II, 168.
[6] *ibid.,* II, 174.
[7] *ibid.,* II, 192.
[8] *ibid.,* II, 168.
[9] *ibid.,* II, 193.

furthest." [10] The trouble really goes back to the Greeks, who came to regard thought as a process away from sensible things to that of which nothing in particular can be said, *i.e.,* pure being. The intellectual process ends where it began with the "it is," [11] and the question may well be asked what there is in the result achieved by pure thinking which is not explicitly in the data. The ostensible result appears to be exactly like the beginning.[12]

The syllogistic logic, built on this conception of thought, thus earns the reproach of consisting in a series of verbal propositions. It represents neither a process of knowledge nor the system of ideas which constitutes the known world. Its sole use is the analysis of what is involved in conceded general propositions.[13] Scholastic nominalism was the legitimate offspring of syllogistic logic. It is simply the recognition that syllogistic logic was merely analysing the meaning of names.[14]

The truer view is that thought, rather than having found things with attributes given independent of it, which it proceeds to abstract, is the faculty of synthesis that constitutes the attributes.[15] Thought is a process from the abstract to the concrete. The subject begins with "mere being," "there is something," and this something gradually becomes further qualified as it is held in relation to other experience. "Thus 'concrete' objects are gradually constituted by a process which is conjointly one of synthesis and analysis." There is not first one and then the other, but in putting together experiences, the world is resolved into distinctness, and in being so resolved assumes definite features which can be combined.[16] This is then the real process of thought. Green's theory of judgment is simply an elaboration of this conception.

ii

1. Opposed to the formalists, the school of which Mill is taken as representative held logic to be the science of the method of knowledge. But the view of the method of knowledge depends entirely upon the notion of what the object of knowledge is. And this in its fulness is the question: how is knowledge possible? or, "What are the presuppositions as to our relation to the objective world from which we must start in inquiring what the method is by which we come to scientific knowledge?" And whether this be the question of metaphysic or of psychology, as those hold who deny the possibility of metaphysic, the answer must affect logic.[17] Green insists that every logic is grounded in a metaphysic, for of course he could not grant that psychology could provide its foundations. The trouble with Mill was that, not being able to resort to metaphysic—"that fertile field of delusion propagated by language" [18]—for his presuppositions, he derived them, often unknowingly, from the english empirical tradition. His attempt to write a logic in the belief "that it will be found that most of the conclusions arrived at in this work have no necessary connexion with any particular views respecting the ulterior analysis," [19] must appear as quixotic as Bacon's belief that he could write a scientific treatise in which we will find "the world as God made it, and not as men have made it; for that it hath nothing of imagination." [20] It is natural, then, that underlying every logical doctrine for which Green takes Mill to task, should be found some mistaken metaphysical presupposition.

2. At the basis of Mill's metaphysical misconceptions, is the lockeian *idea* and the equivocation it involves. According to Locke, *idea* is the immediate object of the mind in perception and thinking. But this is negated by the doctrine that some ideas are copies of qualities of matter, others are effects, though not copies, of such qualities. Green's point is that Mill does not escape this confusion, for "It is implied in all language which speaks of us as knowing things through sensation, and describes sensations as impressions made by external matter." [21] Only by the recognition of matter as a congeries of relations constituted by thought, can this be entirely overcome. Like the other empiricists, Mill asserts that all knowledge is of phenomena, and then makes *phenomenon* do double duty as a state of consciousness, and a thing with qualities. His particular form of the berkeleian and humeian idealism consists in sometimes writing as if everything could be reduced to a state of consciousness, but he admits the contrary

[10] *Works,* II, 192.
[11] *loc. cit.*
[12] *ibid.,* II, 162.
[13] *ibid.,* II, 160; *vide infra,* p. 78f, for Green's criticism of Mill's theory of syllogism.
[14] *ibid.,* II, 161.
[15] *ibid.,* II, 192.
[16] *ibid.,* II, 193.

[17] *Works,* II, 158.
[18] *Logic,* I, vii, 5.
[19] *ibid.,* intro., 7.
[20] *Sylva Sylvarum,* intro.
[21] *Works,* II, 263.

in his distinction between the feeling of color and the processes which take place in his optic nerve and brain as the agency of the feeling.[22] Thus does Mill constantly waver between the false idealism which holds that everything is a state of consciousness, and the true, that except in relation to a thinking consciousness there is no reality or existence.[23] As throughout all his critical writings, Green maintains that phenomena cannot at the same time be feelings and objects. If they are mere feelings, no relation between them is possible. In order that relations of sequence and simultaneity may obtain between them, they must be, "not feelings as merely felt, but felt objects, feelings as thought of."[24]

3. This ambiguity in the conception of *idea,* leads to Mill's antithesis between thought and things which clouds such a large portion of his logical doctrine. In his frequent attempts at realism, he holds that a proposition expresses "'belief having reference to things'" and not, as lockeians had supposed, "'to our ideas of things.'" Of course, Green comments, the belief expressed by a proposition relates to things, and it may be questioned whether anyone was ridiculous enough to maintain that it related only to a "mere idea," "in the sense of something which in the act of belief I regard as merely belonging to my own mind, as distinguished from 'things.'" Nor did Locke, in his definition of knowledge, mean "idea" to carry this sense.[25] There is no doubt in Green's mind but that Mill is right in saying that such a proposition as "gold is yellow" does express belief about *things.* But he cannot maintain this, and hold at the same time the antithesis of thought and things—"the doctrine that a thing, to be a *real* thing, must be something with the constitution of which thought has nothing to do."[26] It may be claimed, in opposition to Green's charges, that when Mill says the judgment "gold is yellow" is not a mere analysis of nominal essence, but expresses belief in regard to an outward thing, he is simply accomodating himself to popular usage: he means that it represents a relation between phenomena.[27] But, as we have seen, *phenomenon* for Mill is a chameleon-like term, taking upon itself any meaning the context requires. The proposition "gold is yellow" may express a uniform coexistence

[22] *Logic,* I, iii, 4.
[23] *Works,* II, 212.
[24] *ibid.,* II, 218.
[25] *ibid.,* II, 197.
[26] *ibid.,* II, 198f.
[27] *ibid.,* II, 199.

in nature between certain phenomena, but how, in Mill's terms, is knowledge of such uniformity possible? Certain appearances may frequently concur or closely follow upon one another, but their coexistence in an order of nature is quite another thing. It is not the appearances that can be said to coexist, but only the qualities which appearances are taken as representing.[28]

Locke said straight away that the frequent sequence of one appearance on another does not become either real coexistence of qualities in a thing or a uniform sequence of phenomena in an order of nature. Mill, in pronouncing otherwise, in saying that a certain experience justifies us in ascribing some quality as a permanent attribute to a *thing* (such as combustibility to a diamond), is constructing reality upon a "conception of our mind," the category or formal relation of thing and quality. In this contradiction, Green finds that "He is doing what Locke a hundred and fifty years before had seen to be incompatible with the antithesis between reality and the work of thought, which yet Mill retains. He is recognising a real world, formed by the intellectual interpretation of feelings as representing a system of things. He is finding reality, not in the mere 'present sensation,' but in relation by which each sensation as it presents itself is determined, though they are themselves present only as thought *about,* and in the ideal thing, 'gold,' 'diamond,' etc., which these relations combine to constitute.[29]

Green agrees with Mill, then, in his account of the import of propositions, that the judgment "gold is yellow" is other than an analysis of nominal essence; that it expresses a true belief about real outward things. But is this not thought to be the very point of disagreement between the idealist and empiricist? To Mill, certainly, it was, but Green's divergence from the empirical doctrine lies elsewhere. The real question concerns the interpretation of both *thing* and *outward.* To the idealist, the thing exists only for thought, and is *outward* only in the sense of being in space, a relation constituted by thought. It is not outward in the sense of being "outside the mind," "which in fact is nonsense." Again Green inveighs against this persistent confusion over objectivity and externality; a confusion that reigns throughout the history of empiricism.[30] The difficulty is, as Bosanquet expresses

[28] *Works,* II, 199.
[29] *ibid.,* II, 200.
[30] *supra,* p. 52f.

it, that men fail to distinguish the sense in which "my mind is in my head," from that in which "my head is in my mind." [31]

4. A further metaphysical difficulty underlying Mill's system of logic is his misunderstanding of the categories. As will be seen further on, Mill adopted an essentially misleading order in beginning with names, going on to nameable things, and finally to the import of propositions. If he had begun the other way round, with the import of propositions, analysis of which would have supplied him with a doctrine of categories, he would not need to have attempted to supply it in the chapter *Things Denoted by Names.* He could then have gone on to classify names according to the function they serve in different sorts of propositions.[32] The question, in fact, which Mill is inconsistently answering in chapters two, three, and five of the first book of his *Logic,* Green holds to be: "What are those primary relations without which there would be no world of connected matters of fact to be known at all, and of which all other relations are determinations,—which form the universal element which is particularised in all knowledge?" These relations are conceptions, constituted by the act of conceiving, by the presence of the ego to the "manifold of sense." [33] Since they are the presuppositions of experience, they cannot be accounted for by the genetic method, or such a process as is called a "natural history of knowledge." It is possible, of course, to trace the process by which they have found abstract expression, but not to trace the process by which formal conceptions have originated. Mill's etymological method of getting at their real significance, "by ascertaining the exact nature of the sensuous clothing in which they were first invested, is childish." [34]

Mill himself regards *categories* in the scholastic way as *summa genera* of things. This wrong view of them goes along with the notion of thought as abstraction, from which it follows that the end of thinking is to reach certain γένη τῶν ὄντων having no common elements with each other. According to this view, they are the end of knowledge and are really apart from the objects of ordinary knowledge and experience, being abstracted from these. The right view, according to Green, "regards them as the relations or formal conceptions . . . without which there would be no knowledge and no objective world to be known. They are not the end

[31] *Essentials of Logic,* p. 17.
[32] *Works,* II, 196.
[33] *loc. cit.*
[34] *ibid.,* II, 197.

but the beginning of knowledge, not ultimate truths, but truths which we already know in knowing anything. . . ." [35] But for a theory of the categories, Mill professes to substitute a classification of existences. This, however, does not serve the purpose of a theory of the categories, which is the disentangling of the presuppositions of knowledge and experience, for it necessarily involves them. In reality, it is a theory of the universe and presupposes an answer to the question as to how such a theory is possible. To such a classification of existences, thought brings itself and the relations it constitutes in knowing. Thus, as an example, when Mill attempts to know *states of consciousness* as *existences* he has already converted feelings into felt things, by an act which constitutes the relation of identity (one in many).[36] Mill himself asserts that "a state of consciousness," whether a thought or a sensation, has to be distinguished from the object thought about or the object which causes it. Unfortunately, he does not realise that this implies a further exercise of the same intellectual act by which a feeling becomes a knowable object. For such distinctions as those between the sun and my idea of the sun, and between a sensation I receive from it and the property in the sun of exciting that sensation, presuppose formative conceptions not only of thing and quality but also of cause and effect. It is thus clear, as Green maintained in the beginning, that these conceptions cannot properly be regarded as the result of experience, "because without their operation the succession of feelings could not become that experience of things, of a connected objective world, from which alone . . . the doctrine which ascribes them to experience seeks to derive them.[37] Mill's inability to escape the categories can be seen in his classification of names into singular and general, connotative and non-connotative, etc. For these divisions presuppose a proposition representing a conceived relation of thing and quality.[38]

How this misconception of the categories affects the whole of Mill's logic, will be seen throughout, but it leads him directly into a hopeless *cul-de-sac* through his dichotomy of body and mind, and the hypostatisation of a "thing-in-itself."

5. Having assumed the categories of cause and substance in his account of states of consciousness, Mill introduces them as two

[35] *Works,* II, 207f.
[36] *ibid.,* II, 208.
[37] *ibid.,* II, 209.
[38] *ibid.,* II, 201.

separate sorts of *nameable things,* under such designations as the "hidden external cause to which we refer our sensations" and "something distinct from sensations, thoughts, etc. . . . the being that has the thoughts."[39] This is a direct result of the improper understanding of the categories as conceived relations. It prevents his seeing that the "unknown external cause" and the "unknown inner substance" are "each merely one member of the relation which thought constitutes in the very act of knowing 'a state of consciousness,' and one and the same member."[40] Thus easily, Mill gets a "thing-in-itself" and an unknown self or mind, by detaching one member of the kindred and mutually connected relations of one and many, substance and attribute, cause and effect, and treating it as a separate thing. Mill fails to see that this is really to nullify the detached member, for mind and thing are nothing in such abstraction, since the two *noumena* are one and the same member of the formal relations from which they have been severed. Although Mill avoids using the same language in regard to the *thinking thing* and body, Green finds that in effect what is said of the one is also said of the other.[41] The truth is that the so-called *thinking substance,* which is the source of substantiation, is not properly a substance at all.[42] Yet, as has been seen in the examination of Kant, it is the only "thing-in-itself" which can be talked about intelligently.[43]

One of the outcomes of this abstraction is Mill's antithesis of reality and theory. On the basis of his doctrine that thought or conception merely results from impressions which are made on us by things existing quite independently of thought, he cannot account for any theory. For every theory, quite obviously, corrects sense, or rather the first inferences from sense.[44] But it is not that things are first real, as Mill seems to hold, and then there is a theory about them. The reality of things, in truth, "is their determination by each other as constituents of one order, a determination which only exists for thought. . . . The reality *is* a theory."[45] And just as no notion is a phenomenon but a relation between phenomena constituted by a conceiving mind, so the

[39] *Logic,* I, iii, 8.
[40] *Works,* II, 209.
[41] *ibid.,* II, 210.
[42] *ibid.,* II, 206.
[43] *ibid.,* II, 211.
[44] *ibid.,* II, 268f.
[45] *ibid.,* II, 269.

copernican system, for example, is a way of holding the planetary motions together as changing appearances of one principle. It is a conception and, at the same time, a reality, "not a mere theory *about* reality."[46] Mill's position in this regard is simply a variation on an old theme. Whenever relations, that are the work of thought, no matter how few they may be, are read into the "impressions of sense," there must ensue a distinction between reality and the work of the mind.

iii

1. Turning now from general metaphysical notions underlying Mill's logic, to particular doctrines of the logic itself, Green finds, as we have mentioned, Mill's order in proceeding from names to propositions essentially misleading. For names cannot be classified without reference to the *things* which they signify, and *things* can be given only in propositions. As Mill himself admits, the proposition is the minimum of belief or possible truth. Nothing less is a matter of fact at all, and apart from the proposition a *nameable thing* has no intelligible character; "it is for knowledge nothing."[47] When Mill distinguishes names as singular and general, what he really means is propositions. For except in relation to a proposition the distinction has no meaning. *John* and *man* mean something only because they are symbols for judgments in which qualities might be asserted of them as subjects. And the distinction between judgments concerning John and judgments concerning man lies in the more complex determination by attributes of the object *John* than of the object *man.* Thus the true distinction is that between singular and general propositions.[48]

Mill's distinction between connotative and non-connotative names makes the same presuppositions as that between singular and general names, and results in even greater confusion. A singular name, he says, which is not connotative is unmeaning.[49] Still "it shows what thing it is we are talking about," though it does not "tell us anything about it." Green's obvious commonsense query is, "But if it has no meaning, how can it show what we are talking about? If 'John' to the person I am talking with did not recall an object determined by certain qualities, there would be no good in talking to him about John." It is connotative

[46] *Works,* II, 269.
[47] *ibid.,* II, 196.
[48] *ibid.,* II, 202.
[49] *Logic,* I, ii, 5.

in every proposition in which it is employed. If unlike gold it does not by itself involve a multitude of propositions, it is because that by itself it is a mere sound that represents no mental act at all.[50] Thus *John*, in so far as it has meaning, does not differ from the *sun* which Mill distinguishes from it.[51] It is clear, then, that Mill's classification of names is derived not from their use in predication but from their dictionary meanings. He is misled by the worst kind of logolatry.[52]

The distinction, likewise, between concrete and abstract names presupposes propositions and the relation of substance and attribute. Those names which "signify an attribute only," appear to do so only through detachment from a proposition. They "arise from the act of the mind in regarding what it has first regarded as an attribute determining a subject, as in turn itself a subject determined by attributes." This substantiation of attributes would be unintelligible were the relation of substance and attribute something found ready made in things. But apart from thought there are no things, and what we consider individual substances in the beginning are for the most part temporary substantiations.[53]

2. Both Mill's empiricism and his treatment of names apart from propositions show themselves in his doctrine of relations. That all names as significant, or as used in predication, are of relations, he seems to recognise only when he comes to treat of propositions.[54] Mill's great difficulty arises in his second class of relations, those not grounded on states of consciousness, such as the relations of resemblance and succession. They are states of consciousness made up of other states; certain states put together.[55] This is the logical outcome of that idealism which takes idea as equal to feeling, for it must reduce objects to feelings and compounds of feelings. Mill instinctively tries to reduce relations to compounds of states of consciousness, for once relations other

[50] *Works*, II, 203.

[51] *ibid.*, II, 204.

[52] With this criticism of Mill's treatment of terms may be compared that of F. C. S. Schiller, which though from a very different standpoint metaphysically, employs much the same treatment, and arrives at quite similar results. (*Formal Logic.*, ch. III.) The correspondence of his criticism of Mill's methods and theory of induction with that of Green is also to be noted.

[53] *Works*, II, 205f.

[54] *ibid.*, II, 215.

[55] *loc. cit.*

than such compounds are admitted, there is no choice betweeen recognising an order presented from without other than that constituted by feelings, and admitting the originative action of thought; this admission being "that something results from the action of thought on feelings, other than the feelings. . . ." [56] This is the inescapable dilemma of the false idealism.

Mill's method of reducing relations to feelings is best seen in his account of resemblance. Resemblance, according to him, is the feeling of resemblance, and this is not a third feeling over and above the resembling feelings, but these two together. This doctrine may be briefly criticised. In the first place, how do successive feelings put themselves together? [57] Empiricists remain strangely unembarrassed by this question; they evidently accept the miracle. Further, if the relation of resemblance is simply two feelings put together, the relation of resemblance between two feelings of color cannot be anything but a color itself. This is obviously absurd, but it is yet not the strangest of all the qualities with which relations have been endowed. It remains to be asked, how the likeness between a feeling of color I had yesterday and one I have today, since it is merely the two together, can be talked and thought of when the two feelings are gone forever. The conclusion must be that though relations are grounded on states of consciousness—for if we did not feel, no world of related objects would exist for us—they cannot themselves be regarded as states of consciousness.[58]

When he came to attributes such as color, Mill himself sensed the difficulties in his theory. Overlooking the relation of identity involved in all judgments, such a judgment as "'this is the same color I saw yesterday' means, according to him, 'very like it,' for 'the feeling which I had yesterday is gone never to return.'" [59] But even granting this, how can he legitimately assert it to be a different sense in which we are said to be "'sitting at the same table?'" For a like difficulty about the identity of the table must arise if it be reduced to states of consciousness. It cannot be re-

[56] *Works*, II, 215.

[57] Here again, as in the criticism of Hume, Green is able to criticise empiricism through his atomistic conception of feelings. But in this case, too, it may be maintained that he is right as against the doctrine he is attacking, for feelings are hardly anything else to Mill than they are to Green. *cp. supra*, p. 11, n. 39.

[58] *Works*, II, 215.

[59] *ibid.*, II, 216.

duced to a single state, but only to several, each of which is gone before the other begins. The only solution to this perplexity clearly lies in the recognition of the table as an object constituted by intellectual synthesis of states of consciousness, and not as a series of states of consciousness themselves. As such, it is hard to see how it differs from color in the above judgment, for a like operation of thought on successive feelings of color is necessary for their conversion into an identical object.[60] Again it is probable that these inconsistencies might have been avoided had Mill begun his *Logic* with a thorough analysis of propositions, rather than with the treatment of names and nameable things.

3. Corresponding to the confusion between thought and things are the two really inconsistent views of the proposition that run through Mill. According to one of these, it states a relation of attributes, according to the other a relation between phenomena, which he interprets as states of consciousness, *i.e.,* feelings. The truth is not that some propositions express the one, some the other, or that the relation between attributes is reducible to sequence or coexistence of phenomena (in the above sense), but that every proposition expresses a determination of an object by attributes,[61] " the thought of an object under relations." This is equally true, whether the object is given in intuition or not, whether it is merely conceived or also perceived.[62]

The worst and most unfortunate result of the abstraction of names from propositions is the mechanical view of the proposition that logically ensues. According to this conception, the proposition is made up of two ideas which are supposed to be held together, in some mysterious way, by the copula. To Green " it is a mistake to think of the subject as representing one idea and the predicate another." For this conception, Green substitutes the fecund notion of the proposition as an organic whole, representing one idea, " in the sense of a conception of relation between attributes." [63]

4. A further confusion in Mill's treatment of propositions is his continuation of Locke's old distinction between *instructive* and *trifling* propositions under the names of *real* and *verbal.* The latter are those in which the predicate merely represents, or is

[60] *Works,* II, 216.
[61] *ibid.,* II, 218.
[62] *ibid.,* II, 216.
[63] *ibid.,* I, 181.

supposed merely to represent, an idea already included in the complex idea for which the subject-name stands.[64] The difficulty arises, however, in ascertaining what propositions are to be so regarded. " ' All men are mortal,' " for example, is real, while " ' all men are animals ' " is verbal. The distinction is a subtle one, and arises through Mill's regarding as verbal all propositions which are *essential* in the scholastic sense, *i.e.,* have to do with the meaning of a name. And it appears easy to decide what attributes are of the essence so long as essence is regarded as fixed by a definition; " but once admit that the meanings of names fluctuate, that the same name means different things to different persons, and it becomes impossible to say in regard to any general proposition . . . whether in the predicate you assert more than you imply of everything to which you apply the subject-name." [65] Thus, this is not a true logical distinction, arising from the analysis of propositions in their actual contexts, but comes about through certain unacceptable presuppositions as to the nature of the proposition and the dictionary meaning of names. Green's whole objection to formal logic (in the strict sense) is just that unless the proposition is merely verbal formal logic can have nothing to say to it, and unless it is more than verbal it represents no process of thought whatsoever.[66]

Among the presuppositions of Mill's doctrine of mathematics has to be reckoned this doctrine which relegates to the analysis of nominal essence all propositions which do not concern matters of fact, and at the same time ascribes universality to propositions which do concern matters of fact. In so doing he ignores Locke's recognition that universality could not belong to propositions concerning matters of fact if they are taken to equal statements of events, and can belong to mathematical judgments only on the supposition that they concern mere ideas.[67] Thus Mill is forced to make mathematical propositions, since they are not *trifling* or *verbal,* concern matters of fact, which necessitates his whole empirical theory of mathematics.

Connected with these conceptions is Mill's theory of the definition as the " ' most important of propositions purely verbal.' " This means that the definition relates not to matter of fact or

[64] *Logic,* I, vi, 4.
[65] *Works,* II, 221.
[66] *loc. cit.*
[67] *ibid.,* II, 231.

reality but merely analyses a complex idea.[68] The trouble is that his distinction between real and verbal propositions, on which his theory of definition is based, is suitable only to the view which regards every general proposition as verbal and thus loses its meaning. Accordingly, he identifies definitions with verbal propositions, but his instances show that their object is to state some real relation of properties, a real coexistence of attributes in a real subject.[69] In other words, their object is just that of Plato and Aristotle, and Mill's dissent is purely verbal. Green finds amusing the ensuing paradox that "whereas the ancient logic, supposing itself to be defining the nature of things, really was but analysing the received meanings of general names, the modern logic, while insisting that it is only explaining the meaning of words, is really engaged in gradually defining the nature of things."[70] Whether or not this can stand regarding the failure of ancient logic to attain its end, it does sufficiently indicate the discrepancy between modern logical and scientific theory and actual modern practice. And at the basis of modern inadequacy of theory is the fear of doctrines that are but poorly understood. For as Green finds to have been the case with Mill, he could not allow that definition can ever be of the "nature of things" because of his fear that this implies the "reality of essences"—that there are real things corresponding to the meaning of general names.[71]

iv

1. Concerning inference and syllogism, both the understanding and criticism of Mill's doctrine are complicated by the fact that he is to a large extent right as against the doctrine he is attacking. But he often misinterprets his own objections and draws from them conclusions which they do not imply. He is right, for example, in holding that the ground on which we draw conclusions concerning cases unknown to us, is not that "'the unknown case is proved by known cases,'" or that "'it is proved by a general proposition including both sets of cases, the unknown and the known.'" But it is a long step from this to the doctrine that the proof that Socrates is mortal is that this, that, and the other man

[68] *Works,* II, 233.
[69] *ibid.,* II, 233, 235.
[70] *ibid.,* II, 235.
[71] *ibid.,* II, 235f.

have died,[72] that it is a "'generalisation from observed particulars given by sense,'" summarised in the general proposition. The principal question then, in Mill's theory of the syllogism, concerns the nature of generalisation.[73]

It may be taken in three different ways. "Is it (*a*) a process from concrete individuals, by omission of their distinguishing attributes, to a class; or (*b*) a process from a constantly observed sequence of one sensible event upon another to the involuntary expectation of one upon the recurrence of the other; or (*c*) a process from a multitude of separate events to their uniform conditions (relations) or single cause?"[74] Mill seems to waver between the three. The first is readily recognisable, according to Green, as the doctrine of the scholastic logic. The second is the doctrine of Hume which reduces necessity to a high degree of psychological expectation. The syllogism was based on the first of these views of generalisation, on classes resulting from abstraction from the distinguishing properties of individuals, and its validity depended on the predicability of the class-name of this individual or species.[75]

2. Mill retains the scholastic view of the syllogism except that he does away with the need for complete enumeration, as Bacon had before him, but in a less explicable way. If his inductive methods enable us to dispense with complete enumeration, it is "because they imply a conception of inference in fact wholly different from the conception of it as generalisation from many observed cases to all possible cases, from what has happened often to what will happen always" (Mill's form of necessity as subjective expectation). Mill, in truth, has one conception of inference in connection with induction, another in his doctrine of the syllogism. In induction he recognises that "a general truth is something quite different from a summary statement of a multitude of particular events," as he conceives it to be in his theory of syllogism.[76] He maintains that a principle ascertained by experience is more than a mere summing up. He does not see that it is so only because it is not a *summing up* at all. This comes about through his retaining the old view of the general proposition concerning matter of fact as a summary of what has often happened, and yet seeing that such a summary is not a scientific truth. Thus he has to

[72] *Logic,* II, iii, 4.
[73] *Works,* II, 273.
[74] *loc. cit.*
[75] *ibid.,* II, 274.
[76] *ibid.,* II, 276.

think of it as a summary and something more. But, as has been said, it is only this something more because it is not a *summary,* "but a statement of the permanent condition of phaenomena. . . ." [77]

This changed conception of inference logically requires a modification of Mill's theory of induction, which he makes consist in concluding that what was found true in certain instances holds in all similar ones. For there is no inference from those instances to all similar ones, for if they are really similar, they are covered by the principles discovered in the observed instances. Clearly then, inference does not lie in the generalisation from observed instances to all, but "(*a*) in the discovery of the real conditions of the observed instances, (*b*) in the discovery whether other apparently like instances are really like. Given the real similarity of the other instances, there is no inference to them." [78] Such a doctrine breaks down the old distinction between inference in geometry and in natural science. Whether it is a matter of the hypotenuse of an equilateral triangle or of the chemical constituents of water, the inference is to a universal, the only difference being that in the latter the qualification "under the same conditions" is necessary, while it is not in the former because the conditions cannot be different.[79] In both subject-matters, the inference is to an eternal and unchangeable relation, and it may be arrived at from a single instance, the only difference being that natural science can arrive at only "conditional general truths." [80]

Nowhere does Green's divergence from his contemporaries appear more complete or more striking than in this conception of inference. In one sense it is revolutionary, but its return to platonic and aristotelian principles must have appeared reactionary to Mill and his school. That a single instance is sufficient for a universal generalisation, that the subject-matter of science is not observed phenomena but universals, must have struck strangely on the ears of men who could maintain, for example, that the generalisation that all the radii of a circle are equal is as true of all circles as it is of any one: "but it is not exactly true of any circle; it is only nearly true; . . . ." [81]

3. With this background it is now possible to criticise Mill's

[77] *Works,* II, 276.
[78] *ibid.,* II, 277.
[79] *loc. cit.*
[80] *ibid.,* II, 278.
[81] Mill, *Logic,* II, v, 1.

theory of the syllogism. Green's argument is that what Mill gives as the "'universal type of the reasoning process,'" [82] neither properly represents the process nor, as the syllogism does, the result of reasoning. The process of inference, for Mill, depends on discovering the attributes in the certain individuals—Green insists that one individual would do as well—on which the given attribute depends, and determining whether the individual in question in the conclusion shares these attributes. Mill's attempt to argue by a resemblance of *other* attributes than these is not to the purpose; the resemblance proves nothing. The true question is whether the same cause is operative in the two cases.[83] Once this has been settled the inference is over.[84]

Mill's real conception of reasoning is not found in his revised formula of the syllogism but in his account of induction in the third book. There "he understands it to consist in the discovery of the causes of phaenomena, *i.e.,* in a process antecedent to apodeitic syllogism, a process which syllogism cannot represent." And the *deduction* he finds entering into the discovery in certain cases is quite a different sort from that represented by the syllogism.[85]

V

1. Before going on to Mill's empirical doctrine of mathematics, the need for which has already been suggested, we have yet to examine his theory of induction and his treatment of the axiom of the uniformity of nature. The four definitions he gives of induction are misleading. It is not, first of all, Green argues, a process of "'drawing inferences from known cases to unknown.'" [86] The reason is that there is no such inference from known cases to unknown except so far as the unknown become known. We do not infer from the mortality of other men to that of Socrates except as we come to know Socrates as we have come to know other men in respect to their mortality. We do this by ascertaining the conditions on which mortality depends. Nor is induction an "'affirming of a class a predicate which has been found true in some cases belonging to the class.'" This gives us either no inference at all or a *petitio principii.* For unless you know

[82] *Logic,* II, iii, 3.
[83] *Works,* II, 278.
[84] *ibid.,* II, 279.
[85] *ibid.,* II, 280.
[86] *Logic,* III, ii, 5.

" whether the classification is a valid one in respect of the attribute affirmed, there is no inference from ' some cases ' to the class; and when you know this, there is no more room for inference." Mill's third definition is the one that corresponds to his theory of syllogism. It makes induction consist in " ' concluding, because some things have a certain property, that other things which resemble them have the same property.' " We have seen that mere resemblance has nothing to do with it whatever, and if the resemblance becomes settled as identity of conditions, the inference is over. The fourth definition holds induction as the conclusion that a thing will have a property at other times because it has it at a certain time. Green protests that it is not a question of times at all. Induction has nothing to do with the times at which phenomena have been observed, except so far as diversity of times is connected with diversity of conditions.[87]

2. Mill's misconception of the *axiom of the uniformity of nature* follows upon this misunderstanding of the nature of induction implied in his definitions. " It is regarded as an assumption that things resembling each other in a great many points will resemble each other also in others, or that what has happened often will happen always, that the future will resemble the past." [88] The interesting thing is that for the ground of this assumption we are referred to induction by simple enumeration. This means that enumeration furnishes us with a rule which enables us to dispense with enumeration. The embarrassing question might be asked as to how we know that those instances we do not need to examine on the strength of the rule " might not be just what would invalidate it if they were examined." [89] Again we find modern theory inadequate for the explanation of scientific procedure, for such a bundle of expectations as simple enumeration can yield has nothing to do with the ground of induction as it is actually practised. The true assumption of induction is rather that of the unity of the world than that of the uniformity of nature. It is so, at any rate, " if the latter is supposed to be equivalent to the assumption that the future will resemble the past." [90] It is not a question at all of different times, or the experience of different times, resembling one another, but of their being part of one system. If it is truly interpreted as meaning that " experiences of the future will be part

[87] *Works,* II, 281.
[88] *ibid.,* II, 218f.
[89] *ibid.,* II, 282.
[90] *loc. cit.*

of one system with the present, the result of conditions that now are . . ." distinctions of past and future are not applicable.[91]

As to the origin of this principle, Mill argues against its *a priori* nature, in true english fashion, on the ground that uneducated men do not believe it. According to Mill, men only come to believe nature uniform by interrogating her, and it is Green's contention that Mill has then to account for the interrogation, since we make it only on the supposition of uniformity. The contradiction is patent. The interrogation which is to give the supposition of uniformity, presupposes it.[92] But if this basic assumption of induction is neither born ready-made with every man (the lockeian conception of *a priori*), or derived from observation, how do we come by it? Green's transcendentalist answer is " that it is implicit in the simplest act of knowledge." [93] We can no more derive it from processes of sense, as these would be without it, than we can derive life from mechanical and chemical functions of that which does not live.[94] To the transcendental philosophy, " The unity of the world is the unity of the thinking subject." [95] The conception of nature as a system of mutually determining parts is the primary form of the intellectual life and is merely the development of this original determination of feelings by relation to the one thinking subject.[96]

3. The true function of induction is thus not indicated by Mill's definitions. At best they describe only an incident of the process. The essence of induction is the discovery of the causes of phenomena. Mill's formula, if it is to be true at all, must substitute *same* for *similar,* and thus become the identical proposition that what is true of a particular phenomenon is true of all phenomena determined by the same conditions. The whole movement of science is a process from mere similarity between phenomena to real identity, which is, identity of conditions. Once this is over, there is no further inference from some cases to all cases, or from certain times to all times.[97]

This conception of induction clarifies the three kinds of propositions over which Mill became confused. The general proposi-

[91] *Works,* II, 283.
[92] *ibid.,* II, 283.
[93] *ibid.,* II, 284.
[94] *Proleg.,* sect. 73.
[95] *Works,* II, 284.
[96] *loc. cit.; Proleg.,* sect. 73.
[97] *Works,* II, 284.

tion states the conditions of a phenomenon, the singular its occurrence, and the collective summarises any number of singular propositions. Clearly, Mill is right then, in holding it to be the business of induction to arrive at truly general propositions, but this is not in keeping with his treatment, in connection with syllogism, of the general proposition as merely a register of a multitude of singular propositions.[98] When Mill asserts that our universe is so constituted " ' that whatever is true in one case is true in all cases of a certain description,' " [99] he is recognising a universal of a very different kind from that which he admits in his book on reasoning, and is going beyond his own definitions of induction, and nullifying, in a sense, his own methods. The business of induction becomes then the finding of " a true and adequate description of the single case, to find the sum of its conditions." [100]

4. Connected closely with Mill's theories of induction is his separation of description and explanation as two distinct and different processes. Green regards the quarrel of Whewell and Mill over the colligation of facts and induction as a valid recognition on the part of Whewell of the work of thought in the constitution of facts.[101] It all goes back to the ambiguity of the word *fact*. Even Whewell spoiled his own case by often writing as if the superinduction of ideas upon facts was merely an operation we had to perform to get science. Mill is thus right in his rejoinder that our ideas come from the facts, but not against the true doctrine " that it is only the ' colligating ' action of thought which constitutes those relations in which the ' facts ' themselves consist." [102] Both these men convert the true opposition of thought and feeling into one of thought and fact.[103] All science can be described as a colligation of facts through superinduction of conceptions, if it be understood that conceptions are relations, that there is no fact apart from such superinduction, either on feelings or on imperfectly conceived facts. The phenomena that scientific men discover the conditions of, are already the products of much colligation. They are highly determinate facts.[104]

The various stages in the process of knowledge, such as observation, description, induction, and the like, cannot be distinguished as if they were separate processes.[105] Mill can make this distinction only on the ground of his belief that facts are given independent of thought. For once this is accepted, it is natural to think of thought as abstracting conceptions from the facts. But the question arises, if the observations are not already connected and determined by the conception, how can it be abstracted from them? Mill's whole difficulty in attempting to differentiate between Kepler's *description* of planetary motions and Newton's *explanation* of them is an artificial one, and disappears when it is recognised " That there is inference in the simplest observation, if everything is inference which goes beyond sense, . . . and there is no more inference than this in any induction." [106]

Mill's theory of induction, his methods and canons and all the elaborate machinery he devised to safeguard the process, are based on this separation of facts and relations or conceptions. Empiricists everywhere assume that the facts of the world are at all times the same, that only the methods of explanation differ. Bacon, in his insistence on facts, carried this idea so far as to believe that once we had the facts of the world, a limited and finite number, collected and set forth, the completing and perfecting of all sciences would be the work of but a few years.[107] It is not that Mill held to anything so absurd as this, but that he did conceive facts as being in the same sort of isolation from conceptions. This is the point of Green's criticism of his separation of observation, description, and induction.

5. Induction, it has been said, has to do with the causes of phenomena. But like many other doctrines in Mill, his theory of causation is clouded by his attempt to be a humeian and at the same time account for the actual procedure of science. It was further confused by the limited choice offered by contemporary english thought between causation as the uniform sequence among phenomena, or as a mysterious tie between one phenomenon and another.[108] Hume made cause and effect to consist in the liveliness and involuntariness with which one feeling follows upon another.[109] When modern scientific men suppose themselves to have adopted Hume's doctrine, by two alterations they make it a doc-

[98] *Works,* II, 285.
[99] *Logic,* III, ii, 5.
[100] *Works,* II, 293.
[101] *ibid.,* II, 285.
[102] *loc. cit.*
[103] *ibid.,* II, 285f.
[104] *ibid.,* II, 289.
[105] *Works,* II, 286.
[106] *ibid.,* II, 294.
[107] *Parasceve,* Robertson ed., p. 402.
[108] *Works,* II, 296.
[109] *ibid.,* II, 297.

trine that cannot be arrived at from Hume's premises. Yet Hume's doctrine leaves a residuum in ordinary scientific men, consisting in the belief that " there is nothing in any phaenomenon to account for the uniform sequence of another upon it "; and that our belief in causation results from repeated experience, transmitted from generation to generation.[110] The answer to the second belief has already been given in the discussion of the categories; the answer to the first is that " ' no idea or object ' *can* be ' considered in itself '; and just because it cannot, every ' idea and object ' compels a conclusion beyond it." [111] Though not always explicitly, Green is forever criticising this atomistic particularisation of ideas, persons, and things.

Hume's modern followers cannot be so strict as he, or there would be an end of inductive logic. Yet they commonly accept antitheses which make induction impossible, one of the most noteworthy of which is that between reason and cause, " between the order of facts and the order of thought." [112] Upon examination, this absolute antithesis between the relation of reason and consequence and that of cause and effect is a corollary of the false antithesis between thought and reality, which is at the bottom of all empiricism, and accompanies the reduction of reality to mere individuals. But all the teachings of science imply that there are no such isolations in nature, that individuals are logical fictions, " that no event happens which is not determined by, and does not contribute to determine, the whole system of nature; . . . ." With this recognition, the notion of cause and effect as an invariable sequence, must necessarily fall.[113] " Thus, as no real object is a separate object, so no known object, in being known, can be considered by itself. ' What is beyond it ' constitutes both its reality and its knowability." What is beyond it, in relation to its knowability, is the reason of which the object is the consequence, and vice versa; what is beyond it in relation to its reality, is the cause of which the object is the effect, and vice versa.[114] The import of Green's doctrine is far reaching. The recognition of the cause and effect relation as one facet of the relation of ground-consequence, together with the insistence that the reality of a thing is the thing in the fulness of its relations, removes him

[110] *Works,* II, 300.
[111] *ibid.,* II, 301.
[112] *loc. cit.*
[113] *ibid.,* II, 302f.
[114] *ibid.,* II, 202.

completely from the current of english philosophic thought and identifies him with the idealistic tradition that has come down from Plato.

These doctrines obviously require a different conception of cause than that found in Mill. They destroy the notion of it as something antecedent in time, substituting in its place, the conception of cause as the sum of the conditions of a phenomenon. For Green, " Any effect in its reality = its cause." Take, for example, the cause of water as the combination of hydrogen and oxygen in certain proportions. This combination equals the event.[115] Thus a causal relation is not a relation in time, and in the definition of cause as " unconditional antecedent," the terms are incompatible with each other, since no unconditional antecedent can be found short of the whole system of nature. That which gives the system of nature its character, is not, then, simultaneity or succession, but " a unity which is properly eternal." [116] For the narrow modern restriction of the notion of cause to the *efficient* cause of Aristotle, Green is clearly substituting the aristotelian *formal* cause. But these cannot be regarded as two mutually exclusive explanations, since the latter includes the former. That is, the formal cause, the definitory formula, is not complete if it does not include the efficient cause.[117]

vi

1. The empirical theory of mathematics, as elaborated by Mill, is the logical outcome of the separation of thought and reality, of the theory of thought as abstraction, and of the belief that all propositions not about matters of fact are purely verbal. Green's criticism purports to indicate the rôles these preconceptions play, together with the untenable nature of the conclusions derived from them.[118]

[115] *Works,* II, 303.
[116] *ibid.,* II, 305.
[117] Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* 1044 b, 10.
[118] In this section of his work, chs. F, G, H, of his criticism of Mill, Green leaves off confining himself closely to Mill's text, and develops his own doctrine instead. Only occasionally does he point the difference between it and that of Mill. It is interesting to compare this treatment of Mill and the empirical theory of mathematics with the criticism of a more recent *neo-kantian,* Cassirer. (*Substance and Function,* ch. I, sect. ii; ch. III, sect. iv.) Both criticisms reveal the same underlying disagreement with the empiricistic postulates, and the same insistence on the inadequacy of its account.

Green thinks that all discussion as to the origin and nature of mathematical reasoning turns on the consideration of space. It is characteristic of empiricists to separate space itself from our beliefs about space. This having been done, they can easily account for our beliefs about space as derived from sensitive experience. Mill, Spencer, and the rest, think that the question between them and Kant concerns "merely the origin of our *beliefs about* space," and Spencer's great discovery, that the strength of conviction attaching to our beliefs about space is the result of the experience of endless generations, shows how entirely this question has been misapprehended. What is to be explained is the nature of space, which is an idea, of course, but not a *mere* idea. The strength of conviction with which the individual accepts certain beliefs about it is not to the point.[119]

Space is the condition of all perceivable objects, and it presupposes the action of thought upon sense. It is a particular mode of the relation which obtains between sensible objects. Thus geometrical space is an abstraction of one relation by which objects are determined from all other relations, but it is not an abstraction from sensitive experience, for it is only in experience just so far as experience is not merely sensitive. And it is not space as an abstract object that is the condition of experience, but space as a relation.[120] Space is thus objective, since it depends on the universal conditions under which consciousness regards its object, but this does not mean that it is external, any more than the object of consciousness is external to it.[121]

Time is another of the relations by which objects are qualified,[122] and is the primary condition of sensibility. It is "the form of a relation between all feelings as attended to, as converted by the presence of thought into felt objects determined by mutual relation." It follows that mere feelings are not so determined and thus are not in time at all.[123]

Space in three dimensions is "an object considered simply under the relation of externality to other objects all about it. . . ." Out of the possibility of this detachment and substantiation of a relation constituted by the action of thought upon sense, the science of geometry takes its rise.[124] In the same way, by detachment of the relation of time, we get mere time as an object which may be treated as a *quantum*. It is then clear that the idea of number is not derived from that of time, for it must have been got by abstraction of the relation of otherness before time could be regarded as a quantity.[125]

[119] *Works*, II, 238.
[120] *ibid.*, II, 243f.
[121] *ibid.*, II, 270.
[122] *ibid.*, II, 252.
[123] *ibid.*, II, 256.
[124] *ibid.*, II, 244.

These conceptions of time and space underlie explicitly Green's criticism of Mill and any other thinker who tries to derive the notions of time, space, and number from sensitive experience; who regards mathematics as of empirical origin; and who attempts to limit the certainty and necessity of mathematical truths.

2. Mill believed that the necessity and certainty attributed to mathematical truths was an illusion, and he followed Locke in maintaining that the only way this illusion could be sustained was by supposing that these truths relate to purely imaginary objects.[126] Green seeks to show by way of refutation on what mathematical certainty and necessity is really based. Geometrical certainty, he finds, begins with the definitions on which geometry rests. These definitions represent the performance of certain mental acts, acts of mental construction, "the result of which no experience can modify. . . ." [127] These definitions represent neither the analyses of the connotation of general names (which Locke was willing to grant at the expense of consistency), nor a certain stage of discovery, like definitions of the sciences.[128] Mill's objection to this doctrine that geometry rests on definitions really amounts to the fact that it does not depend on the use of any particular name. But what do names have to do with it? Obviously enough, we can call a particular ideal drawing a circle or anything else we wish, but no one can legitimately object to calling such ideal drawing definition.[129] The only reason for Mill's objection is derived from the notion that definition merely has to do with names, a notion from which he himself departs in regard to scientific definitions.[130]

Geometrical certainty follows immediately from the nature of geometrical definition. In the fifth proposition of Euclid, we are certain that this one isoceles triangle can be taken to stand for all isoceles triangles whatsoever. But not at all for the reasons

[125] *Works*, II, 257.
[126] *Logic*, II, v, 1.
[127] *Works*, II, 246.
[128] *loc. cit.*
[129] *ibid.*, II, 246f.
[130] *ibid.*, II, 247; *supra*, p. 75f.

which Mill would advance, that it is a generalisation from the experience of a great many such triangles that enables us to assume that all triangles resembling these in certain respects resemble them also in this one. Green maintains, to the contrary, that "We are only entitled to this certainty because these triangles, being made by ourselves out of elements obtained by abstraction of that which is the condition of all possible outer sense, are not liable to modification by other conditions." [131] The proposition could not go beyond the bare instance if it represented a sensible event now happening, while on the other hand if the propositions on which the demonstration rests were but analyses of nominal essences, the science could never advance, could never reach an *instructive proposition*. The truth is that each singular proposition, yielded by the mental construction of new simple figures, is equivalent to a universal.[132]

It can now be seen that mathematical necessity arises from the primariness and simplicity of the mental acts by which the mathematician obtains his materials. Since we do not find, but make geometrical definitions they are necessary not in the sense that we cannot help making them, but are necessary in the sense that they are formed out of the material yielded by abstraction of a necessary condition of experience.[133] Furthermore, those who unlike Mill allow for the necessity *a priori* of mathematical truths misrepresent the distinction between such necessity and the contingency of truths about nature. The distinction cannot be held to mean that in natural science, unlike mathematics, what is once true is not always true, or that natural laws are liable to change, mathematical laws not. As was suggested above,[134] "The true distinction is between what is fully true and what is partially true. What is fully true once is fully true always, of a natural phaenomenon no less than of a geometrical figure; but any proposition about a natural phaenomenon is true of it only under conditions of which we do not know all, while a proposition about a geometrical figure, if true at all, is true of it under conditions which we completely know." [135] In this, Green is simply making the aristotelian distinction between facts known relatively and facts known absolutely.[136]

[131] *Works*, II, 248.
[132] *loc. cit.*
[133] *ibid.*, II, 249.
[134] *supra*, p. 81f.
[135] *Works*, II, 249f.
[136] *Nic. Ethics*, I, 2.

3. The conventional empiristic method of escaping the conclusions just drawn is by the doctrine that the propositions of geometry are only *hypothetically* true, *i.e.*, "true on the assumption that there are objects corresponding to our definitions, which *really* there are not; . . . ." It holds, for example, that there are really no straight lines answering to our definitions, but only lines near enough straight that we can treat them as straight without serious discrepancy between our reasoning and the reality. To use Mill's own words, in a slightly different context, the proposition that all the radii of a circle are equal is so nearly true "that no error of any importance in practice will be incurred by feigning it to be exactly true." [137] Green attempts to expose the assumptions on which such a doctrine is based. He claims that it results from the notion that the real is the sensible—a sensation or a collection of sensations—and then attempts to show that this view logically excludes geometrical propositions altogether. Everyone would see this if they really asked themselves what they meant by *sensible objects*. "If they did, they would see that so far as geometrical propositions relate to sensible objects at all, it is in virtue of that in the sensible object which is not properly seen or felt, is not a sensation of sight or touch, at all." [138] Instead of asking themselves this question, they hold real lines to be sensations and then find that they do not correspond precisely with the definition. But the question, very clearly, is not one of more or less correspondence, as it is generally supposed to be, but of any correspondence whatever. There is simply no relation between the two. The real line is the relation that is obtained by detachment of a purely intellectual element involved in the sight of bodies. The contrary notion arises from supposing that the real line is a black stroke drawn on paper. To Green the truth is on the opposite side. The real line is the line constructed by thought corresponding to the definition and there is only a seen line through the superinduction of this thought line on the sensation of color.[139]

In short, this whole modern view of mathematics as hypothetical, the notion that figures exactly corresponding to our definitions are but supposed and do not really exist, is based on the conventional commonsense distinction between idea and reality. For it is agreed that the definitions represent ideas but not ideas

[137] *Logic*, II, v, 1; *supra*, p. 78.
[138] *Works*, II, 250.
[139] *ibid.*, II, 251.

to which real objects can be found to correspond. Locke saw that the only way of accounting for the universality and exactness of mathematical truths was to make them hypothetical. Hume could admit no such distinction because with him the real was the impression and the idea the fainter impression. The moderns follow Locke rather than Hume and although they might find it hard, if pressed, to consistently maintain their distinction between idea and reality, it is this that keeps their theory of mathematics afloat.[140]

There is a sense, finally, in which mathematics is hypothetical, and the conventional view is partly a corruption of this. It is hypothetical not in supposing things to be what they really are not, "but as supposing the condition of mutual limitation to be apart from other conditions." The limitation is real enough, but it is not really the sole condition of anything. "There are no mere spaces as geometry supposes, but other conditions present along with that of space do not alter it." [141] Thus the hypothesis that is corrected in our application of conclusions derived from a set of geometrical propositions to the physical world "is not that there are geometrical figures which really there are not, but that things are subject to geometrical conditions only." [142]

4. The one doctrine of empirical mathematics yet to be considered is that concerned with the origin of mathematical knowledge as a system of generalisations from experience. Nowhere does Mill's approach to mathematics appear more patently fallacious. This is disguised, however, by the ambiguity of the term experience. It is not to the purpose, for example, to argue that mathematical truths are derived from the sequence of impressions and then to proceed to abstract them from the experience of facts. For then the further question has to be answered as to the relation of this experience to the sequence of impressions.[143] The real question is (*a*) "what is that in experience from which the primary truths of geometry are derived, and (*b*) how are they derived from it?" [144] Mill's answer to (*a*) would seem to be

[140] *Works*, I, 232f.
[141] *ibid.*, II, 251.
[142] *ibid.*, II, 261. Mill states this himself (*Logic*, II, v, 2) when he says, ". . . if the hypothesis merely divests a real object of some portion of its properties, without clothing it in false ones, the conclusions will always express, under known liability to correction, actual truth."
[143] *ibid.*, I, 460f.
[144] *ibid.*, II, 258.

"sensation," and to (*b*) "generalisation." Green's answer to Mill concerning the first is that geometrical truths are derived not from sensation but from a relation by which sensations are determined in becoming perception, and concerning the second, that not generalisation, as a universal assertion arrived at from a frequently observed relation between phenomena, is the source of mathematics, but "a detachment and reduction to its simplest expression of the above-mentioned relation. . . ." Such detachment yields propositions as certain upon the first apprehension as they can ever become upon no matter how often repeated apprehension.[145]

Here Mill's essential contradiction becomes apparent. He would derive geometrical definitions by generalisation from what exists, is seen, and felt, when he will not allow that there exist, are seen, and felt, objects having such properties as the definitions state. On such a basis he will have to account both for the materials from which the definitions are made and their application to reality when they are made.[146] Mill would have us get the idea of a straight line from seeing innumerable lines nearly straight, and thus he has to allow that it is not a copy of impressions, but an alteration of them. The question that immediately arises is, "How I can see a line to be nearly straight, if I have no prior idea of straightness?" If the definitions are the results of generalisation, a passive mind had to habitually assume a straight line in place of that which it sees, which is a difficult requirement. "We cannot abstract what is not there to be abstracted," Green insists, and thus "if straight lines are not in the things which we see, by no abstraction or exclusive attention can they be got out of them. . . ." [147] Mill fails to see that the difficulty is not in seeing a straight line, but in seeing any line at all, for "a straight line is constituted by the simplest form of that intellectual act which is necessary to 'seeing' any line whatever." [148] Mill has again committed the usual *petitio principii* that is involved in any attempt to derive from experience that which is necessary for there to be any experience at all.

The empirical theory of the origin of mathematics may be most clearly examined in Mill's doctrine of number and counting. Green asks how, without sheer nonsense, we can call the mental act which yields the number twelve a generalisation from experi-

[145] *Works*, II, 258.
[146] *ibid.*, II, 260.
[147] *ibid.*, II, 260.
[148] *ibid.*, II, 261.

ence: "an assurance gradually attained that what has happened constantly will always happen." The empiricist's answer is that collections of objects amounting to twelve are always striking our senses. Of course, Green agrees, but he asks the further question "do these amount to twelve for a merely sensitive consciousness?" By that he insists that if we are going to speak of twelve or any other number of objects as striking our senses, we will have to make twelve a light or a color, to which no one will agree. The conclusion must be that "only because 'sensible objects' are already numbered or numerable through a synthetic act of thought," can there be "an appearance of our deriving ideas of number from them by abstraction and generalisation." [149]

In the same way, Mill's account of two and one being equal to three as an inductive truth assumes just that act of counting which is to be explained. It is easy to show how, having found that the same three objects presented in separate parcels produce a certain set of sensations and produce another set of sensations if presented in one parcel, we are led to believe this will always happen in the case of any three objects, and thus to formulate the proposition *2 plus 1 equals 3*. But an aggregate counted as three is assumed in our comparing sensations produced by one parcel of three objects with those produced by the same objects in two parcels, and having once counted them as three we already know that 2 plus 1 equals 3. Mill fails to see that "the whole question at issue relates to the synthetic act of counting, the act by which various numbers are given." [150] Having assumed this act, or its results, he then makes a show of deriving these results from the experience of objects which they render possible. It all arises from the empirical habit of treating attributes in the way of quantity simply as feelings. This can be traced back, in the case of Mill, to his ignoring the difference between feeling proper and the intellectual act through which feeling becomes a felt thing, a known fact. Early in his *Logic*,[151] in asserting that seeing or handling a foot-rule includes a different set of sensations from seeing or handling a yard measure made exactly like it, he is including quantities as well as qualities under the category *states of consciousness*.[152]

[149] *Works*, II, 272.
[150] *ibid.*, II, 271.
[151] *Logic*, I, iii, 12.
[152] *Works*, II, 213.

V

CONCLUSION: EMPIRICISM AND IDEALISM

Having concluded a survey of Green's laborious essays on modern empiricists, we are now in a position to summarize the underlying differences between the philosophy Green called empiricism and the idealism he offered in its place. To do this, one need not dwell at length on his own metaphysical system, as presented especially in the first book of the *Prolegomena to Ethics;* it is necessary to consider his thought only in so far as it is a corrective of, and an antidote to, the errors from which Green thinks empiricism takes its rise, and in which it rests. That this separation of his philosophic thought is legitimate, acquaintances of Green attest. To the empiricists whom he criticised he had given years of the most intensive thought and study, and he was convinced "by long and painful consideration and reconsideration" of the truth of the views he urged against them.[1] But constructively he was a timorous thinker and it is at least open to doubt whether he would have held to the metaphysic of the *Prolegomena* with equal tenacity.[2] Then, too, though his own constructive metaphysic is distinctively german in origin and nature, his essay on *The Philosophy of Aristotle* suggests that he could have proceeded in his critical writings on principles purely greek. The cardinal doctrine, for example, with which he attacks especially Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, *esse est intellegi,* though a variation of the dictum of Berkeley, is to Green no other than the platonic doctrine "that the real is the intelligible and the intelligible the real. . . ." [3]

Lest we fall into the error of setting up abstractions corresponding to the terms idealism and empiricism, it must be understood that they denote here not so much the systems of any particular philosophers, as they do convenient constructions standing for opposed principles and tendencies. The difference between idealism and empiricism, as Green conceived them, is found largely

[1] Sturt, *Idola Theatri*, p. 258.
[2] *loc. cit.*
[3] *Works*, III, 47.

in the difference between the nature of the questions each is trying to answer. For him, the confusion between them lies for the most part in the failure to understand the difference of their questions. It is easy to make this mistake since often the questions are phrased in the same language. A few examples will make this clear, although many are to be found throughout the preceding chapters. Suppose we ask the question, "What is thought?" The popular answer today as well as in Green's time would be: "the psychologist will tell us that." But clearly, the thought which the psychologist can tell us about is not that thought in which our world of interrelated objects exists. Can the psychologist give other than a more or less complete analysis of certain processes and functions of the individual organism which is but one of the objects in our world? Or to take an illustration more explicitly from Green, the *sensible* which we talk about as unreal, in the sense that nothing can be predicated of it, is in no way the *sensible* of the physiologist. For the sense that is the germ of consciousness preceding thought is quite another thing from the sense that the physiologist knows and investigates. In the same way, the idealist, when he says that intelligent experience is constituted by judgment, is speaking and thinking in a different realm from the empiricist who says that knowledge is the result of generalisations from experience.[4]

In all of these cases we are in two different realms of discourse and philosophic disaster is the penalty of confusing them, just as we have seen it to be the effect of the confusion of the psychological and the logical, or of the confusion between objectivity and externality. But, in other cases, the idealist differs from the empiricist simply in his attempt at an ulterior analysis. Hume could glibly say that "all rights and obligations are in some sense 'artificial,'" and be satisfied with himself, whereas Green's question concerns the conditions and the implications of the artifice which constitutes them.[5] But nowhere is this difference more clearly seen than in the use of the term *fact* by the idealist and empiricist. The latter in all times and places is at one with the commonsense university professor who picks up a brick from a pile, weighs it in his hand, takes in its properties with his eyes, and argues with his colleagues, "Now this is what I call a fact. Where is there any theory in this?" Standing in the sharpest

[4] *cp. Works,* III, 48.
[5] *ibid.,* I, 360.

contrast with this view is Green's whole metaphysic, which has been said to be "little more than a prolonged attempt to get to the bottom of the question, What is a fact of experience?" And as Nettleship further notes, "an occasional remark shows that in his mind this apparently simple question involved that of the nature of the world and of God."[6]

In many ways, Green's philosophy is but the result of the application of the law of parsimony to the field of metaphysics. Although so much extolled by empiricists in writing of the progress of science, its application to prior questions is resented as inappropriate. The idealist, for example, refuses to postulate a real world beyond experience when he thinks that he can deal with experience just as well without it. The business of philosophy, to paraphrase Green's own words, is not to guess what is beyond experience, but to analyse what is within it.[7] On this ground, the much insisted upon dictum of the empiricist that there is no knowledge without experience, that experience is the sole source of knowledge, becomes thin and meaningless. As experience, to the idealist, is self-contained and all-inclusive, he finds little need for emphasizing the fact that there is no other source of knowledge besides it. The truth is that the datum, experience, from which the empiricist purports to derive knowledge is already to the idealist a highly complex work of thought. Thus it becomes possible for the more complete analysis—and that is what idealism is for Green—to assign a place in its system to the data and conclusions of other philosophies. To the idealist all philosophies are true just as all experience is real, but as in the case of reality, there are levels of truth. The idealist must, if he would be understood, indicate the position in his system of the world of daily life and practical thought together with the philosophies which spring from them.

The application, further, of Occam's razor does away with false dualisms of mind and matter, ideas and things, which have so beset the philosophies of commonsense. Once having started with these as so many separate data, together with the false antitheses of experience and reasoning, relations of ideas and relations of things, they have on their hands the impossible task of mediating between them. By their own inadvertency they have created

[6] Memoir, *Works,* III, lxxxvi. Sturt, in his chapter on Green, gives an astute presentation of Green's analysis of the judgment "I know this fact." *Idola Theatri,* p. 228f.
[7] *Works,* I, 449.

the *problem* of knowledge, or epistemology in the worst sense of the word. But the critical idealist is saved such thankless labor, for he begins with one assumption in place of two. To him, the world of experience is a world of ideas, an order of thought; relations of things *are* relations of ideas; the principle of sufficient reason embraces the relation of cause and effect; the simplest experience is already a work of thought, a manifestation of the combining and distinguishing activity that is judgment.[8]

For Green, the problem of evolving experience out of that which is constituted as simply the negation of experience, the problem which so bothered Spencer and Lewes, has disappeared. In the same way has Mill's latent difficulty of reconciling phenomenon and noumenon been resolved. Furthermore, the long puzzling problem of the real and the ideal, the sensible particular and the abstract universal, disappears in the recognition that the individual thing is real only in virtue of a relation which is universal. Only through abstraction of the universal from the particular has the difficulty arisen. With the acceptance of the concrete universal it disappears.[9] In summary, what Green understood by true idealism, as opposed to empiricism, consists in "not the admission of an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical, but the recognition of the empirical as itself ideal."[10]

In connection with this refusal of the idealist to multiply entities unnecessarily, it is significant that it was just where Green himself remained in dualisms, or at best only partially escaped them, that his doctrine has been modified or transcended. The most noteworthy of these dualisms is the timeless self, the eternal subject of the world of knowledge, opposed to that world which it renders possible. For metaphysic, Bradley considers it a "psychological monster,"[11] while in ethics, Dewey finds that a self which does not define itself in every desire but distinguishes itself from every desire, gives rise to an irreconcilable antithesis instead of to a progressive realisation of the self in definite members or organs.[12] What Green does is to take the bare fact that there is unity in all experience, abstract the unity from the experience and

[8] *vide Works*, III, 65.
[9] *ibid.*, III, 60, 63.
[10] *ibid.*, I, 188.
[11] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 113f.
[12] "Green's Theory of the Moral Motive," *Philos. Rev.*, I, 599f.

thus set it up over against the experience.[13] Elaborating this notion he gets his Eternal Self-consciousness which constitutes nature by its presence to it. Quite probably, Green's fear of all mysticisms is at the bottom of this dualism which is simply the hypostatisation of the subject-object relation in knowledge. He neither saw the need, nor the logical necessity, of overcoming this dualism by an absolute which should embrace both terms of the relation. His difference from Hegel may be found, to put it in popular language, in his doctrine that nature is real because present to God's mind, instead of real because part of God's mind.[14] Without going into this further, it suffices to point out that Green is here setting up the same kind of dualism, by abstraction, that he condemned empiricists for doing. He did the same thing in his antithesis of feeling and thought, an antithesis which he carried over from Kant, but which was avoided in his earlier study of Aristotle. There, feeling was matter or potentiality, the unformed or less concrete relative to the formed or more concrete, more perfectly known. Haldar has insisted that so long as this sharp dichotomy between feelings and felt-things is maintained, it is difficult to see how thought can manufacture felt-things out of atomistic, evanescent feelings.[15]

To return to empiricism, it may be possible to rehearse briefly the principles of Green's criticism. They represent so many things a consistent philosophy cannot do. The first and most fundamental of these is the one Green expresses in the apothegm, "A consistent sensationalism must be speechless." Directed against all the empiricists, it is none other than Plato's argument against the herakleitians. If the mind is merely a kaleidoscope of impressions, a succession of neural tremors, there is no knowledge, for there is no "now," no "this," no "thing," which remains the same with itself for two successive moments, and all predication is impossible.[16] To Green, just as to Plato, the very word "this" suggests that something has been taken out of the perceptual flux, arrested in the stream of consciousness, and held in relation to a subject which is no one or all of the successive states. It is the doctrine that Green insists upon throughout, that succession cannot itself give the consciousness of succession. If we are to speak then, to use words at all, knowledge must be

[13] *ibid.*, 608.
[14] *vide* Sturt, *Idola Theatri*, p. 247.
[15] "Green and his Critics," *Philos. Rev.*, III, 171f.
[16] *cp.* Plato, *Theaetetus*, 182d–183c.

something other than the succession of sensations. Of mere sensations we know and therefore can say, nothing.

A corollary of this is the principle employed throughout that there can be no boundary, no division, between what is given in experience, so long as anything can be said about it, and the work of thought. Put in another form, that there can be no knowledge without thought, it seems the merest truism, but as urged against Locke and the later empiricists, it prevents them from distinguishing simple feeling from the work of the mind and then qualifying it by attributes only possible for a thinking subject. Immediately following from this is the principle that the real cannot be found outside of mind and yet be given attributes. Although we may maintain that what philosophers hold to be real is a matter of taste, Green's doctrine is that a philosophy that is to be consistent with itself must either find the real in thought, or else refrain from qualifying it by any attributes, for they are all the work of thought. This is the great error in the empirical theory of reality, and is only possible, as we have repeatedly seen, by reading thought-relations into feelings.

A further prerequisite of a consistent philosophy is that it cannot deny the external world, but cannot make its externality an externality to thought. Berkeley and Hume avoided this fallacy, but Locke and the supposed successors of Hume did not. To Green, externality is a relation of body to body but cannot be a relation of body to mind. The external world is external to the animal organism, but is not external to mind. In this way, Green's doctrine avoids phenomenalism on one hand and a mistaken realism on the other. It holds the external world to be real, but finds its reality in relations which exist only for or in thought. The external world is a known world, an object for a subject. The idealist in no way denies the reality of the outer world, as he is commonly supposed to do, but endeavors to explain in what its reality consists.

The last of the fundamental principles which Green employs appears most clearly in his condemnation of the genetic fallacy. For any attempt to derive something from that which was not it, Green substitutes the concepts of potentiality and actuality. A thing can become only that which it potentially is. Though all philosophers who know what they are about agree with the aristotelian dictum that all knowledge is derived from experience, mind or the intellect itself cannot be thus derived, since it is presupposed

in any attempt so to derive it. We are left then with an "active intellect" which "is nothing at all actually before it thinks," but is a place of forms or ideas which "are there not in actuality, but potentially."[17] On this foundation Green maintains that a consistent philosophy cannot make knowledge a matter of ideas and then treat ideas as products of something whose sole qualification is not being an idea. As against Locke, more explicitly, Green's contention is that knowledge is presupposed in his attempt to trace its genesis from simple feeling, and against Mill that the axiom of the uniformity of nature is necessarily presupposed in the effort to derive it by any process of induction. Given knowledge and nature, in short, it is easy enough to derive one from the other, but the value of the undertaking is subject to doubt.

In conclusion, we can in a more general way contrast Green's critical philosophy with the empiricism he opposed. For him, idealism does not perform the gratuitous task of justifying any particular scientific doctrine, or any particular system of religious beliefs and social customs, but it does attempt to interpret, and thereby in a sense, justify, the methods and growth of science, the progressive development of social and political institutions, and man's aspiration toward a completer life. Green's fundamental concern is with the analysis of experience, the actual scientific, moral, aesthetic and religious experience of men. It has been seen that the failure of Hume's philosophy lay in its inability to explain the knowledge we have. In the same way, it is the condemnation of hedonism and utilitarianism that these doctrines "leave large fields of human experience unexplained."[18] It was probably out of this same interest in the interpretation of experience that Green's objection to the literary history of philosophy arises, and leads him to think that "it is possible for knowledge about phi-

[17] Aristotle, *De Anima*, 429a. The passage in which Green develops his conception of Aristotle's creative reason is worth quoting entire as it gives the basis of his argument against the psychogenesis of Spencer and Lewes, as well as against Locke's natural history of knowledge. "In the history of our intellectual life, as we look back upon it, our earlier conceptions are only explicable by later ones; they presuppose them. Thus the 'passive reason,' or reason as developed in us, presupposes an 'active reason' as the condition of its development. Yet no less does the 'active' presuppose the passive, without which it would be force without matter, thought with nothing to thing about. The ἐνέργεια in abstraction from the δύναμις is as unreal as the δύναμις in abstraction from the ἐνέργεια." *Works*, III, 83.

[18] *Works*, I, 369.

losophers to flourish inversely as the knowledge of philosophy." [19]

For Green, ideas could somehow stand or fall on their own merits or demerits, irrespective of any theory as to their psychological origin in the mind of the philosopher who sets them forth. And although he seemed to think it generally agreed in his day that the "saint is not explained by being called a fanatic," he did not live to see the time when the mystic could be *explained* in terms of complexes and neuroses, the saint in terms of inhibitions and thwarted desires, and the idealist philosopher in terms of "escape" from a world against which he rebels on account of his impotence for action, and the inner recognition of the uselessness of his calling.

[19] *Works*, I, 4.

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